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This thesis deals with the possible shifts in NATO's
strategy for the rest of the 1990s. It uses a strategic
planning model to explore these possible shifts in strategy.
Strategic planning is a systematic process of defining the
mission and the objectives and creating action plans, policies
and resource allocations to achieve them. Every organization
should initiate strategic planning in order to address the
evolving needs of its stakeholders. NATO, which was founded
as an organization in 1949, has to do the same thing. The
general mission of NATO was to protect the freedom and the
well-being of its member people. During the period of 1949-
1989 NATO faced a massive Soviet threat and so defined
objectives and formulated strategies to contain it. NATO's
environment has radically changed since 1989. Although the
general mission of NATO has not changed, it needs to identify
new objectives and formulate new strategies in order to cope
with the current and potential threats, and to exploit these
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The general area of this research covers the changing
role of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) . Specifi-
cally the thesis studies the changing political and military
environment in Europe, the diminishing Russian threat,
instability in former Soviet Union and countries of Eastern
Europe, the effects of trouble in other areas such as the
Middle East on the Alliance, and the effects of all of these
factors on the strategy of NATO. The thesis also summarizes
the environment that NATO faced in the past with the strate-
gies developed to manage it.
B . OBJECTIVE
Literature sources on strategy and strategic planning
processes are reviewed in order to develop a model and come up
with useful tools to facilitate the process. This model then
is applied to NATO during its first 40 years in order to
illustrate the usefulness of it in the strategic planning of
the Alliance. The model is again used to develop a new
strategy for NATO in today's circumstances.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary question
As a result of the changing military and political
environment in Europe and in other troubled areas, the
strategy of NATO must be re-examined. How is the existing
strategy likely to change in light of these shifts in NATO's
relevant military, political and economic environment ?
2. Subsidiary Questions
a. What is strategy and what is a suitable model to
formulate strategy?
b. How was the military and political environment
when NATO was founded?
c. How did NATO's strategy evolve during its fist 40
years?
d. What has happened in the past three years that is
relevant to NATO's future?
e. In light of the changes in the environment what
should be the new strategy of NATO?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
1. Scope
This thesis deals with strategy formulation for NATO
through a general model for this purpose. It provides a
useful model for strategic planning and applies it to NATO.
The intention is to familiarize the reader with the strategy
development process and show how this process can be applied
to NATO to formulate its strategy in this changing environ-
ment.
In the environmental assessments, in-depth political
analyses are not presented, since those analyses are outside
the scope of this thesis. Only the related information that
is essential in the strategy formulation process, is present-
ed. Environmental analyses are confined to the former Soviet
Union, the Eastern Europe, the Middle East and the North
Africa, since these are the primary places in which the
developments have a direct impact on NATO. Other areas which
have very little or no impact on NATO are kept outside the
research.
2. Limitations
There is a vast amount of literature about strategy
and strategic planning. The strategic planning model which is
presented here is only one of the models in the literature.
This model is chosen due to the characteristics of the
organization under study. It is modified somewhat before
being applied to NATO.
The cut-off point for the events mentioned in this
thesis is March 1992. Events after this date are not men-
tioned in this study because of the time table for thesis
completion.
3 . Assumptions
The membership, organization and decision making
bodies of NATO are assumed to stay relatively constant in this
study so as to provide a stable framework for examining
strategic planning specifically.
E. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
This study outlines the strategic planning process, and
applies it to NATO to formulate its new strategy. For this
purpose strategy and strategic planning from various books
were reviewed. Definitions in this thesis come from Strategy
and Policy (Arthur A. Thompson jr & A J. Strickland, 1978)
,
Management (James A.F. Stoner & R. Edward Freeman, 1978) and
The Strategy Process (Mintzberg and Quinn, 1991) . Scenario
building approach for possible future events is taken from
Creating Strategic Vision: Long -Range Planning for National
Security (Smith, Allen, Steward and Whitehouse, 1987) . The
strategic planning model is taken from Strategic Planning for
Public and Nonprofit organizations (John M. Bryson, 1988)
.
A broad literature was reviewed to understand the
environment during the formative years of NATO and to under-
stand the strategies developed to manage it. This literature
includes the books published about this subject and articles
in newspapers and the periodicals. Congressional documents
were also reviewed. Researcher conducted a serious of
interviews with the National Security Affairs Faculty of Naval
Postgraduate School to analyze the current environment and
forecast the future developments. Those interviewed included
Kennedy R. Minnot, former Ambassador, Dr R. Laba a Russian
expert who has spent six months in Russia recently, Kamil T.
Said who is a Middle East expert and teaches courses about the
region. Newspaper microfilms and periodicals were examined
covering the period from 19 89 until March 1992. Major
periodicals were Time . Newsweek and the Economist and the
major newspaper was the New York Times . But, material was
also gathered from other periodicals, Rand research reports,
books and broadcasting media. Analysis of all these material
brought about the current environmental analysis. Possible
future developments are subjective and furthermore, the
author's judgments. But they are also judgments based on the
analyses of the experts and comments in the publications and
the broadcasting media and the testimonies of high ranking
officials such as the director of the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before
the congressional committees. The author also gathered a vast
amount of material from the publications written by the
military and political experts such as the Secretary General
of NATO, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Commander of Allied
Forces Southern Europe, Chairman of the Military Committee
about the future direction of NATO. The author also examined
the press communiques, which summarize the main issues
discussed in the North Atlantic Council meetings and released
by NATO press service. All these he used to formulate a
strategy for NATO.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
This thesis consists of seven chapters beginning with
chapter I which provides an introduction to the subject,
objectives of the research, the research questions, the scope,
limitations and the assumptions, literature review and
methodology and organization of thesis. Chapter II furnishes
the reader with useful information about strategy, strategic
planning and strategic decisions and presents a model for
strategic planning along with some useful tools. This chapter
also contains information about NATO's decision making bodies.
Chapter III outlines the NATO's history through the strategic
planning model presented in chapter I. Chapter IV presents
the current environmental analysis while chapter V deals with
the possible future directions of current events that may
affect NATO. In chapter VI, mandates, mission and the
strategy of NATO are re-examined and revised. Chapter VII
offers conclusions and some recommendations.
II. STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC PLANNING
A. INTRODUCTION
A wise person once said, "If you don't know where you are
going, any road will take you there." [Ref. 1:P. 3] The
person who first said this may not have realized it at the
time, but he or she captured in a nutshell the importance of
an organization's strategy. With a well-defined goal and an
effective plan to get there, an organization can overcome even
the most vexing obstacles to succeed greatly. Without these,
however, even the most wealthy and talented organization is
likely to fail miserably. The importance of a sound strategy
cannot be overstated.
It is also true that sound strategies are not formed by
accident. In almost every case, successful strategies are the
results of hard work and disciplined investigation, undertaken
in a systematic way. Not surprisingly, many methods for
developing strategies have been developed by those who study
organization science. Many others have used these existing
methods to analyze their own organizations. This thesis, a
systematic analysis of the evolution and formulation of the
strategy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
,
falls into the second category.
By examining NATO's past strategies and how they were
made, some useful conclusions may be reached regarding NATO's
future strategic planning, especially in today's radically
changing environment of Europe.
Before applying the principles of strategic planning to
NATO, however, these principles should be defined. In this
chapter the terms strategy, strategic decision and strategic
planning are defined and a model for strategy formulation is
presented. Also some tools and techniques for strategic
planning are listed which will later be applied to NATO. In
particular, those decision making bodies of NATO responsible
for strategy formulation are examined.
B. DEFINITIONS
Strategy is an ancient concept. The word "strategy"
comes from the Greek "strategeia" , which meant the art or
science of military command. Effective army generals knew
that leading an army, winning a battle, holding territory,
protecting a city from invasion, and destroying the enemy each
required a somewhat different plan of action and a different
deployment of resources. They developed broad but detailed
plans which enabled them to reach their objectives. Develop-
ing strategies today works essentially in the same way.
There are several definitions of strategy. According to
one, strategy embraces those managerial activities associated
with defining a purpose or mission, working out a comprehen-
sive master plan for the organization, marshalling necessary
resources, and directing the organization in the pursuit of
chosen goals and objectives. In another, it is the broad
program defining and achieving an organization's objectives.
Strategy can also be defined as the organization's response to
its environment over time, or the pattern or plan that
integrates an organization's major goals, policies, and
actions into a cohesive whole. A well -formulated strategy-
helps to marshal and allocate an organization's resources into
a unified and viable posture, taking into account its
strengths and weaknesses, anticipating changes in its environ-
ment and being aware of possible moves by its competitors or
opponents.
Each organization should have an effective formal
strategy- -one that lists the most important goals to be
achieved, the most significant policies guiding or limiting
action, and the major action sequences or programs to be used
to accomplish the defined goals within the limits set. The
most effective strategies are developed around a few key
concepts and around thrusts, in which the concepts are acted
out. Strategies created in this way are more likely to have
cohesion, balance and focus. Strategies must deal with the
unpredictable and also with the unknowable. The unknowable
are those areas which cannot be observed or measured. The
parts of a large and complex organization may each have their
own strategies in addition to the overall plan, but each of
these should be mutually supporting.
Strategic decisions are those which determine the overall
direction of an organization and its long-term viability in
the presence of change, both predictable and unpredictable.
These decisions closely shape the goals of the organization.
They define the broad limits within which the organization
operates and dictate how resources will be allocated. They
also determine the overall effectiveness of the organization;
that is, whether it has made good use of the resources
available to it
.
Strategic planning is a disciplined effort to shape and
guide what an organization is, what it does, and why it does
it. Strategic planning involves gathering information,
exploring alternatives and carefully examining the future
implications of present decisions, all on a broad scale.
Strategic planning is important, because it helps to develop
a clear-cut concept of an organization. This, in turn, makes
it possible to formulate the plans and carry out the activi-
ties that will bring the organization closer to its goals.
Strategic planning also enables managers to prepare for and
deal with the rapidly changing environment in which their
organization operates.
C. A MODEL FOR STRATEGIC PLANNING
Many models have been developed which describe the
process of strategic planning. The following six-part model
contains the essential elements of strategic planning for a
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public or non-profit organization. [Ref. 2] In order to
develop an effective strategic plan, the organization must:
1. Identify its mandate (s) ,>
2. Clarify its mission and values.
3. Assess its external environment: opportunities and
threats.
4. Assess its internal environment: strengths and weaknes-
ses.
5. Identify the central issues it faces.
6. Formulate plans to manage the issues.
In the next section, each of these steps will be examined
in detail and Figure 1 at the end of the section illustrates
the process
.
D. EXPLAINING THE MODEL
1. Identifying organizational mandates
The formal and informal mandates placed on the
organization are those things it must not fail to do. Formal
organizational mandates are usually listed in laws, charters
and contracts. Informal mandates are those things that are
generally expected of an organization by those with whom it
deals. For example, a police force is formally charged with
enforcing specific legal statutes but is also expected to
support community activities as well. Additionally, in this
step those things which the organization must not do are
specifically listed. This gives the organization boundaries
11
within which to work. This is also known as the unconstrained
field of action.
There are at least two benefits derived from having
clear mandates. First, the organization's goals will not
conflict with the basic purposes of the organization. Second,
when the people in the organization know the mandates clearly,
it becomes more likely that those mandates will be fulfilled.
2. Clarifying organizational mission and values
Peter Drucker said that "without a sense of purpose
we are quite literally lost." [Ref. 2: P. 95] The
organization's mission provides that sense of purpose. The
desired outcomes of this step are a stakeholder analysis and
a mission statement.
a. Stakeholder analysis
A stakeholder analysis is a very important step
because the success of an organization depends mainly on
satisfying those it serves. If an organization does not know
who its stakeholders are, then the organization will not be
able to decide either where it should be going or what it
should do. A stakeholder analysis is a detailed examination
of those who benefit from the organization. There are three
parts to this analysis. First, the organization identifies
exactly who its stakeholders are. Second, it finds out how
the stakeholders measure its success. Third, the organization
may rank its stakeholders according to their importance.
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b. Mission statement
A mission statement contains the distilled
essence of the organization's purpose. The statement should
answer the following questions.
1. Who are we?
2. What are the basic needs we exist to meet or what are
the problems we exist to solve?
3. Specifically, how can we best meet these needs and solve
those problems?
4. How can we best satisfy our key stakeholders?
5. What is our philosophy and what are our core values?
(We remember that only strategies in harmony with that
philosophy and core values are likely to succeed;
strategies that are not are likely to fail.)
6. What makes us distinctive or unique? (If there is
nothing unique or distinctive about the organization,
perhaps it should not exist.)
We will gain a number of benefits from clarifying
organization's mission and core values. First, the mission
statement draws the attention to the points which are truly
important. Second, it clarifies the organization's purpose.
Third, explicit attention is given to philosophy and values.
An organization which does not understand its philosophy and
values is likely to make serious errors in strategy formula-
tion (step 6 of the model) . They may choose strategies not
consistent with their values and philosophy and as a result
may fail.
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3. Assessing the external environment: opportuni-
ties and threats
Organizations cannot escape being affected by outside
forces. In many cases, outside events are so significant that
an organization may not survive if it does not prepare for
them. Unanticipated threats may doom an organization.
Likewise, the cost of missed opportunities may be so great
that the organization may be abolished or dismembered by its
stakeholders. It is no accident that so much effort is placed
by the world's governments into obtaining information.
Organizations should monitor the political, economic,
military, social and technological forces and trends in the
external environment. When this step is completed the
organization should be able to answer the following questions:
1. What major external opportunities do we have?
2. What major external threats do we face?
4. Assessing the internal environment: strengths and
weaknesses
This step complements step three. In this step each
organization examines its own strengths and weaknesses. Every
organization has its own strengths and weaknesses. Since the
organizations seek to maximize their strengths and minimize
their weaknesses, it is important first to know exactly which
are which. Upon completion of this step organization should
be able to answer the following questions:
1. What are our major internal strengths?
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2. What are our major internal weaknesses?
To answer these questions organizations can monitor resources,
current strategy and performance.
5. Identifying the central issues facing an organization
Together the first four elements of the process lead
to the fifth, the identification of the central, or strategic
issues which address fundamental policy questions. A state-
ment of a strategic issue should contain three elements:
first, the issue should be framed as a question that the
organization can do something about. If the organization
cannot do anything about it, it is not an issue for the
organization. Second, the factors that make the issue a
fundamental policy question should be listed. The organiza-
tion should ask, "How does this issue affect our mandates,
mission, values, or internal and external environment?"
Third, the consequences of failing to address the issue should
be defined.
There are a number of benefits from identifying the
strategic issues. First, attention is focused on what is
truly important. Second, when the issues are well-defined,
the answers will address the problem more effectively.
Clouded issues can easily create conflict. Third, identifying
the issues usually creates the kind of constructive tension
necessary to prompt organizational change. Organizations do
not change unless they feel a pressure or tension that
requires change. Fourth, identifying strategic issues should
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provide useful clues about how to resolve these issues. This
step therefore is aimed at focusing organization's attention
on what is truly important for its survival and effectiveness.
6. Formulating strategies to manage the issues
The purpose of this step is to create a set of
strategies that effectively link the organization and its
constituent parts to the external environment. These strate-
gies are articulated in various strategy statements which are
also the desired outcome of this step. Typically these
strategies will be developed in response to the strategic
issues. Upon completion of this step an organization will
have a clear picture of how to meet its mandates, fulfill its
mission and deal effectively with the situations it faces.
The organization will have a clear idea of why it should act,
where it is going and how it will get there.
Strategy development begins with identification of
the alternatives. Once the alternatives are developed the
effectiveness of each should be evaluated. Effectiveness can
be measured by two criteria: how realistic the alternative is
in terms of the goals and resources of the organization and
how well the alternative will help in solving the problem or
satisfying the key stakeholders. An alternative may seem
logical, but if it cannot be implemented, it is useless. By
the same token, if the stakeholders are not satisfied, the



































Figure 1: Strategic Planning Process
Source: Ref. 2:pp. 50-51
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After choosing the alternatives and evaluating them,
the alternatives best suited to the organization's capabili-
ties should be selected. An effective strategy must be
technically workable, acceptable to key stakeholders and must
accord with the organization's philosophy and core values.
E. MODIFYING THE MODEL
As a defensive organization, NATO was formed in response
to the external threat posed by the powerful Soviet Union and
to the potential internal threat of political disunity, both
of which will be examined in Chapter III. Because of this,
the mandates and mission of NATO, steps 1 and 2 of the model,
cannot be completed until the external threats, internal
threats and strategic issues, steps 3 through 5, are defined.
Therefore, the mission and mandates of NATO will first be
stated in general terms in steps 1 and 2. Next, steps 3
through 5 will be completed. After this, steps 1 and 2 will
be revisited. Finally, strategies will be formulated in step
6.
Another approach could have been to renumber the steps of
the model to fit precisely the order in which NATO is
analyzed, as described above. This is undesirable, since
using an application of a model to define that model weakens
the model significantly.
Over the course of time, tools have been developed to
help when analyzing organizations. The next section describes
18
one such tool which, by providing a method of looking into the




By definition, strategic planning involves looking into
the future. Indeed, it is very hard for organizations to
produce sound strategies without understanding future events.
Forecasting is the systematic process of predicting future
trends and events. These are then used to assess the environ-
ment in which the organization will operate and to identify
the strategic issues, which it will face.
There are two types of forecasting, quantitative and
qualitative. Quantitative forecasting refers to numerical
techniques which operate on "hard" data specific enough to
describe accurately the relationships between variables. This
data is usually collected or consolidated by specialists from
a variety of fields. Like the input, the output or results of
quantitative forecasts are numbers which are then interpreted
for decision makers. For example, we can forecast the demand
for our product in the future by examining the demand figures
for previous time periods. Qualitative forecasting, on the
other hand, is used when hard data is scarce or is difficult
to find. Without numerical data, qualitative forecasting
necessarily relies more on subjective judgments than does
quantitative forecasting. In this technique the qualities of
19
intuition, analytical thinking and broad knowledge of the
areas involved are very useful
.
The end results of forecasting are called alternative
futures. An alternative future may be defined as a possible
future state of events relating to the planning object. A
possible future state of events is one which is feasible or,
more simply, reasonable to expect. A planning object is
simply the organization being analyzed. For example, a
farmers' cooperative may be interested in weather patterns.
In this case, the planning object is the farmers' cooperative
and a possible future state may be three years of drought.
Given this and similar alternative futures, the farmers'
cooperative should be able to make more informed decisions.
Different organizations will naturally concentrate their
looks into the future in only those areas which are relevant
to them. For example, the relevant aspects of the future for
a travel agency is quite different from those of a treaty
organization like NATO.
There are many known methods of forecasting, such as
trend extrapolation, simulation modeling and scenario build-
ing. One which is particularly suited to this thesis is the
method of scenario building. According to Hermann Kahn,
[Scenarios are] hypothetical sequences of events con-
structed for the purpose of focusing attention on causal
processes and decision points. They answer two kinds of
questions: (1) Precisely how might some hypothetical
situation come about, step by step? (2) What alternatives
exist, for each actor, at each step, for preventing,
diverting, or facilitating the process? [Ref. 3:p. 76]
20
Organizations cannot predict the future with certainty, but by
designing a number of plausible future developments they can
construct a possible future whose implications can provide
insight into present decisions.
Scenarios may be quantitative or qualitative or a mix of
both. Under the heading of qualitative scenarios there is an
approach termed the Verbal Description of future events. All
forecasting done in this thesis uses this approach. Given the
complexity of the European military, social, economic and
political landscape, this technique is especially attractive
because it is so flexible. This flexibility, however, brings
with it a limitation that must be recognized: building useful
qualitative scenarios using verbal descriptions relies heavily
on the judgment and creativity of the individuals involved.
Accordingly, to strengthen the effectiveness of this analysis
a significant effort has been made to include elements of
scenarios already established by military and civilian
planners. These can be found in the literature available on
this subject and in the references listed in this thesis.
G. NATO'S DECISION MAKING BODIES
This chapter has been devoted to laying the foundation
for analyzing how a public or non-profit organization should
make strategic decisions. Therefore, a brief description of
NATO's four major decision making bodies is in order. Figure
21
2 at the end of this section illustrates the organization of
NATO.
1. North Atlantic Council
The most important decision making forum within the
Alliance is the North Atlantic Council, established by the
governments of the member states under Article Nine of the
treaty. This article sets up the council:
The parties hereby establish a council, in which each of
them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning
the implementation of this treaty. The council shall be
so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time.
The council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be
necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a
defence committee which shall recommend implementation of
articles 3 and 4. [Ref. 4: P. 18]
The Council is the supreme authority of the Atlantic
Alliance and is the principal political and consultative body
of the alliance. It is responsible to establish general
policy, prepare the budget and to formulate the broad politi-
cal directives used in military planning. The Council meets
at three levels: permanent representatives, foreign ministers
and heads of state and government.
When the Council meets at the permanent representa-
tives level it is known as the Council in Permanent Session.
The representatives have the rank of an ambassador and
directly represent their governments. They focus upon the
political questions affecting the alliance. The Council also
meets twice a year at the foreign minister -level . Ministers
meet to review the world situation, make decisions and issue
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directives for the next six months. The Council only occa-
sionally meets, however, at the level of heads of state or
government . The heads of state or government meet to make
decisions regarding a specific issue or to plan out broad
policy.
2. The Defense Planning Committee
The Defense Planning Committee (DPC) makes decisions
regarding NATO's integrated defense structure. The DPC is
chaired by the Secretary General and is composed of permanent
representatives from all those nations participating in the
NATO integrated defense structure. The DPC meets at two
levels: ministerial and representative. The defense minis-
ters of each country meet twice a year, while the representa-
tives remain in permanent session. All decisions of the DPC
are unanimous
.
3 . The Nuclear Planning Group
The representation of the Nuclear Planning Group
(NPG) is the same as on the DPC. The NPG also meets at both
permanent representative and ministerial levels. Here the
Alliance's nuclear policies are reviewed. The council makes
recommendations concerning current nuclear defense issues and
the alliance's future nuclear defense needs to the DPC.
4. The Military Committee
The Military Committee (MC) is the highest military
authority in NATO. It is responsible for the overall conduct
of the military affairs "of the alliance. It is under the
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political authority of the Council and the DPC, which it
advises on measures it considers necessary for the common
defense of NATO. The Military Committee meets at two levels:
the permanent military representative and chief of staff
levels. Permanent military representatives are military
officers appointed by their respective chiefs of staff, and
they form the permanent session of the committee. The chiefs
of staff of the member countries meet twice each year.
H. SUMMARY
Organizations must have sound strategies if they are to
survive and meet the needs of their key stakeholders. An
organization's strategy contains both its purpose and the ways
it can achieve that purpose. The soundest strategies result
from a careful and a systematic process, and in this chapter
that process has been defined in detail using a six- step
strategic planning model. The useful tool of forecasting
using qualitative scenarios in the form of verbal descriptions
was also examined. Finally, a brief description of NATO's
decision-making bodies is given, which will be useful in
Chapter VI.
The following chapter applies this strategic planning
model to the formation of NATO and to the challenges it faced
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Figure 2: NATO's Civil and Military Structure
Source: Jane's NATO Handbook, 1989-90, p. 66
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III. THE HISTORY OF NATO
A. INTRODUCTION
NATO was founded in 1949 as a response to major external
and internal environmental factors which were perceived to
threaten the security of Western Europe. The process by which
these countries responded is an excellent case study in
strategic planning. This chapter, a detailed examination of
how NATO was formed and how it responded to its changing
environment, will serve to validate the model described in
Chapter II. It will show that although NATO planners did not
consciously follow this model step by step, their plans
included all essential elements of each step.
B. MANDATES AND MISSION (STEPS 1 & 2)
After the end of World War II it soon became apparent
that the countries of Western Europe were in real danger from
the Soviet Union and its allies. The countries of Western
Europe realized that a military and political alliance was
needed to enable them to keep their freedom and recover
economically from the devastation of the war. The mandates
and mission of this new organization would center on deterring
any attack on Western Europe and, if attacked, on providing a
successful defense.
As mentioned in the last chapter, the mandates and
mission of NATO, a defensive organization, cannot be developed
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in detail without first describing the internal and external
environments and the strategic issues that led to NATO's cre-
ation. Accordingly, this general statement of the mandates
and mission will be fleshed out after steps 3 through 5 are
completed.
C. THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT IN 1949 (STEP 3)
The external environmental factors which led to the
formation of NATO consisted of the perceived threats and the
perceived opportunities the Western nations faced after the
end of World War II. There were two main threats: The Soviet
threat to Central Europe and the Soviet threat to Northern and
Southern Europe.
1. The Soviet threat to Central Europe
On June 6, 1944, British, American and Canadian
forces landed in France and opened the long-awaited second
front. By the end of the year, France had been liberated and
the final preparations for the invasion of Germany itself were
underway. On the eastern front, Soviet armies had crossed the
border into Germany. At this time several critical issues
came to the forefront: the future of Poland and of Eastern
Europe, the division of Germany, the role of the Soviet Union
in the war against Japan, the coordination of the final
assault on Germany and the preparations needed to establish
the United Nations. To reach agreement on these issues, the
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"Big Three" (Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin) met at Yalta
early in 1945. [Ref. 5:p. 34]
Stalin arrived at Yalta with some distinct advantag-
es. By this time Soviet forces were crossing the Oder deeper
into Germany and were preparing to launch the final attack on
Berlin. The Red Army controlled nearly half of Europe and
Tito's pro-Moscow communists dominated Yugoslavia. Stalin's
foremost concern was to use these advantages to expand his
sphere of control as far as he could. Security through
expansion was a principle that had motivated the Kremlin for
centuries, and Stalin was no exception. To Stalin and his
government, expansion meant control of neighboring countries
and control in turn meant that the regimes in those countries
must obey Moscow without question. [Ref. 5: pp. 34-38] Thus
the security which the Soviets pictured meant not only an
extension of their military power westward into the center of
Europe but also a radical transformation of the existing
social, economic, and political order in the countries under
Soviet control. At Yalta and later that year at Potsdam,
Stalin assured the allied leaders that he had no ambitions
toward Europe. Subsequent events, however, told a different
story.
The Kremlin started in earnest the "Sovietization" of
Eastern Europe late in 1946. Police action systematically
removed opposition parties until elections could safely return
large Communist majorities, as occurred in Rumania in November
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1946 and in Poland in January 1947. At home, Soviet theoreti-
cians launched a new doctrinal line in October 1946. They
published articles which encouraged Western European social-
ists and the "proletariat" of other nations to revolt against
their governments. [Ref. 6: pp. 41-42] This action of Moscow
created an internal threat in the Western European countries,
especially in France and Italy where the Communist parties
were powerful . France and Italy saw that unless they acted to
prevent it, the events in Rumania and Poland could be repeated
in their own lands. That was, in fact, what Stalin hoped to
see. The Soviets also directly helped the communists in the
Greek civil war, threatened Turkey by demanding territory and
caused a similar crisis in Iran in the same year. All three
of these events will be examined closely in the next section
when the threat to Southern Europe is examined.
Early in 1947 the Soviet Union signed nonaggression
treaties with Italy, Finland, Hungary and Romania. However,
the Soviet government immediately began to ignore the provi-
sions which guaranteed a democratic process in these countries
and moved to strengthen its hold in Eastern Europe. Stalin
pursued his principal political and strategic objectives in
Eastern Europe with a singleness of purpose. He sought to
eliminate all Western influence from the area and to establish
Soviet hegemony. These 1947 treaties legalized most of
Stalin's territorial acquisitions in Eastern Europe: from
Finland, the ice- free port of Petsoma and territory which
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expanded the Soviet frontier to Norway; from Poland, 70,000
square miles of eastern territory; from Czechoslovakia, the
province of Ruthenia; and from Romania, northern Bukovina and
Besarabia. These territorial acquisitions extended the
"legal" borders of the Soviet Union westward to include the
areas under Soviet control. Also the Soviet annexation of
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania gave it control of the eastern
shore of the Baltic Sea. [Ref. 5:p. 45] In June 1947 the
Soviet Union imposed a communist government in Hungary, a
country where relatively free elections had been held less
than two years before in the fall of 1945. U.S President
Henry Truman expressed his feelings about Hungary in a press
conference by saying, "I think it is an outrage. The Hungari-
an situation is a terrible one." [ Ref. 7:p. 190] In Hungary
as in the rest of Eastern Europe, Stalin further consolidated
his power.
On June 5, 1947, Secretary of State George C.
Marshall spoke at Harvard University and expressed America's
willingness to help rebuild Europe, inviting the European
nations to draw up a list of their needs. Under the leader-
ship of British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and French
Foreign Minister George Bidault, a conference of all the
European nations, including the Soviet Union, was convened in
Paris on June 27. Two days later, Moscow unexpectedly issued
a statement denouncing the conference and its proposals. By
July 2, Moscow had withdrawn from the conference and forced
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all the East European countries to follow suit. [Ref . 5:p. 52]
After its departure from the Paris conference Moscow initiated
a series of moves to tighten Soviet control within the East
Bloc. In response to the Marshall plan, Moscow established
the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in June 1947.
The purpose of the Cominform was to consolidate control of
Eastern Europe and to prevent the Eastern European countries
from joining the Marshall plan. Large amounts of Soviet aid
began to flow into Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria to
push ahead with industrialization and to increase Soviet
authority.
In February 1948 Czechoslovakia fell to the commu-
nists. In the 1946 Czech elections the Communist Party had
obtained 3 8 percent of the vote, the largest percentage of any
party. A coalition government had then been formed in the
country. Through 1947 the Czech government had tried to
maintain a balance between East and West, remaining keenly
interested in the Marshall Plan but at the same time bending
to pressure from Moscow. The Cominform had instructed Czech
communists to secure their power by eliminating the other
independent parties. In mid- February Soviet armies began
camping on the Czech border. The cabinet broke up and the
communist leader issued an ultimatum for a new government
which would be under his exclusive control. When the Czech
president resisted, a Soviet mission led by top Foreign
Ministry officials flew to Prague to demand that the president
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withdraw his opposition. The president was unable to resist
their efforts and on February 25 signed over control of the
government to the communists. Truman described the sentiment
of the West, saying, "this coup sent a shock throughout the
civilized world. " [Ref. 6:p. 64] Furthermore, after devouring
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Moscow's appetite for more
conquest seemed greater than ever. A critical question loomed
before the West: where will the Soviets stop? A telegram
sent from General Clay to Washington D.C. at this time
illustrates this tension:
I have felt and held that war was unlikely for at least
ten years. Within the last few weeks, I have felt a
subtle change in Soviet attitude which . . . gives me a
feeling that it may come with dramatic suddenness. [Ref.
8:p. 378]
Later that year another crisis occurred. On June 24,
the Soviet Union imposed a blockade on the Western sectors of
Berlin, which lay 110 miles inside the Soviet zone of Germany.
By doing this they hoped to gain prestige for the communist
cause in the world and especially in Western Europe and to
increase their control over Germany. The blockade was
eventually lifted in May 1949 when it became apparent that it
had failed to achieve these goals. But Moscow's efforts
continued: in October 1949 Moscow set up the German Democrat-
ic Republic (GDR) as a response to the establishment of the
Federal Republic of Germany in the Western zone in May 1949.
Even as Moscow continued to flex its political
muscles the Soviet Union was also becoming a formidable
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military power. In May 1948 the New York Times published a
summary of a report written by General Sibert, The Assistant
Director of the Washington D.C. -based Central Intelligence
Group. This article illustrated the growing Soviet military
might
:
The Soviet Union spent more than $1,225,000,000 on atom
bomb development and other military research in 1947 . .
[and] laid out at least $9,000,000,000 in 1947 for new
equipment. The USSR kept more than 500 German scientists
at work on guided missiles and other new weapons, among
them a new tank which probably is the largest ever built
. . . . [Soviet] demobilization was on a systematic and
selective basis, with basic infantrymen quickly released
while technicians and armored force troops were retained.
The result gave the Soviet Union an army with special
skill in armored warfare. [Ref. 9:p. A- 19]
Hanson W. Baldwin made a similar assessment in the New York
Times in March 1949:
Russia is the greatest land power in the world, and all of
Europe can be reached by land. The Soviet States maintain
a peacetime army built around the structure of 180 to 200
divisions, although many of these divisions are cadre
only. To this huge army must be added the conscript
masses of the satellite powers, forces which are more
distinguished by quantity than quality, but which probably
add the equivalent of some 90 divisions. [Ref. 10 :p. E-5]
This force was huge compared to the total militaries
of the Western European countries and would have been hard to
resist. The situation worsened when in September 1949 the
Soviet Union exploded their first atomic bomb. The Western
countries had never equaled the Soviet Union in terms of
conventional forces but it was thought that Washington's
monopoly over the atomic bomb would deter Moscow from taking
advantage of its numerical superiority. Now this possibility
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was fading. In 1949 free Europe lay in the shadow of a huge
Soviet threat. The Soviets had placed themselves in a
position to overrun Europe with ease.
2 . The Soviet threat to Northern and Southern Europe
In late 1945 the Soviet government informed Turkey,
which had remained neutral throughout most of the war, that it
would not renew the 1925 treaty of neutrality and nonaggres-
sion when it expired on November 7, 1945. As the price for a
new treaty, Moscow insisted on the return of Turkey's north-
eastern districts of Kars and Ardahan. These districts had
been taken from the Ottoman Empire by Russia in 1877 but given
back by the Bolsheviks in 1918 in the Treaty of Biresk-
Litovsk. Their return to Turkey had also been reaffirmed in
the Soviet -Turkish treaty of 1921. Now, however, Moscow
wanted them back and also demanded military bases in two areas
of Turkey: the Turkish Straits, the maritime link between the
Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, and on the Aegean Sea at
the port of Dedea§ac (pronounced deh-DEH-ah-ahtch) , which is
in the European part of Turkey near the Greek port of Alexan-
droupolis. Turkey had presented no threat to the USSR, but
the Soviets continued to apply intense pressure to Turkey by
diplomatic means and by sharp propaganda, both accompanied by
the massing of Soviet troops on the Turkish border. [Ref
.
5:pp. 41-42]
The Soviets began pressuring Iran similarly. Iran
had been occupied by the Soviet Union and Britain during the
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war in order to safeguard the flow of supplies to the Soviet
Union. When the war ended, however, Soviet troops did not
evacuate Iran as Moscow had promised. During their occupa-
tion, the Soviets had strengthened the local Communist Party-
named Tudeh. In December 1945, the Soviets announced the
creation of several new communist governments in Northern
Iran. Iranian troops trying to enter the northern provinces
of Iran were resisted by the Soviet troops still occupying
them. American and United Nations efforts to solve the
problem were rejected by the Soviets. This crisis continued
until late 1946 when the Soviets finally evacuated Iran.
Soviet forces remained, however, on the Iranian border. [Ref
.
5:p. 43]
During this time a communist rebellion was in
progress in Greece. The Soviets, through the other Balkan
communist countries, supported the rebellion forces. If the
communists were to succeed, the Soviets would dominate all of
the Balkans and in turn be control the Mediterranean.
There was also a Soviet threat to the Scandinavian
countries of Northern Europe. In March 1948, Finland's
president received an ominous letter from Stalin. In this
letter Stalin wrote:
I assume that Finland, not less than Rumania and Hungary,
is interested in a pact of mutual assistance with the USSR
against possible German aggression .... Wishing to
establish conditions for a radical improvement in the
relations between our countries, . . . the Soviet govern-
ment proposes the conclusion of a Soviet -Finnish pact.
[Ref. ll:p. 29]
35
Finns who remembered recent events in Prague correct-
ly guessed what Stalin meant by "conditions for radical
improvement." According to the proposed treaty Moscow would
decide when Soviet troops were needed in Finland to "protect"
that country. It was not clear, however, exactly whom they
would be defending Finland against . Germany was under
occupation and Norway and Sweden showed not even the slightest
intention to attack. The Soviet plan of action in Finland was
the same as it was in Eastern European countries : move troops
into the country, strengthen the local communists, help to
seize power and then consolidate the country under Soviet
control. The Soviet -controlled press at work on Finland
attacked Norway and Sweden in the same way. [Ref . 11 :p. 29]
All of these developments heightened fears in Western
circles that Soviet aims were not limited to Central and
Eastern Europe. Few in the free countries could sympathize
with Moscow's stated desire for "security". Moscow's demands
and territorial gains had clearly exceeded its security needs
and in fact had exceeded even the czars' ambitions. The free
countries concluded that the Soviets' real intention was to
dominate Europe and impose its regime by destroying the
democratic process. From its very early days the Soviet
regime had been oriented toward worldwide domination; now
after the war it was finally in a position to put thirty years
of planning to profitable use. Stalin had never sensed so
great an opportunity to expand his control as that afforded by
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the postwar conditions in Western Europe. He held half of
Europe and the other half of the continent lay unexpectedly
before him, politically demoralized, economically devastated,
militarily defenseless. The hunting would be better and safer
than even he had anticipated.
3. Opportunities for the West
Stalin was not the only one who saw opportunity in
these circumstances. Stalin's threat gave the Western
European countries themselves an unexpected one: the eager
involvement of the United States. Isolationism, formed in
part to prevent the U.S. entering into onerous alliances with
the European countries, had been the American foreign policy
since 1826. However, in the face of the massive Soviet
threat, the U.S abandoned this policy and committed its
resources to the recovery and the defense of the non- communist
European countries. President Truman announced the new
policy:
It must be the policy of the United States to support free
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed
minorities and outside pressures.
One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the
United States is the creation of conditions in which we
and other nations will be able to work out a way of life
free from coercion .... The seeds of totalitarian
regimes are nurtured by misery and want . They spread and
grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach
their full growth when the hope of a people for a better
life has died. We must keep that hope alive. [Ref. 12:
pp. 178-180]
The U.S. Congress readily approved the policy, and aid to non-
communist European countries started immediately.
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A second opportunity for Western Europe lay in the
Soviets' political and economic weaknesses. Economically, the
Soviet bloc had not been able to recover as quickly as it had
hoped. The shortage of capital equipment both in the Soviet
Union and in the satellite nations was a serious handicap.
Russian oil and steel production was still less than prewar
levels. So even while attacking the Marshall Plan, the
Kremlin was seeking to increase trade with the West. When
possible, Moscow signed trade agreements with the Western
countries and tried to obtain machines, machine tools and
heavy equipment to ease its economic problems. Politically,
the Soviet Union also suffered the adverse effects of its own
policies of oppression at home. The thought of war was as
terrifying to the ordinary Russian as it was to a citizen of
any other country. As a result the Soviet peoples' nerves
were on edge. Also, the forceful establishment of communist
regimes in the satellite countries was bitterly resented by
the people of these countries, creating a powerful hatred of
Russia. [Ref. 13 :p. E-3] By increasing rate of their own
economic growth and deliberately leaving the Soviet Union to
deal with its own problems, the Western countries hoped to
build an economic and strategic "buffer" as their moderniza-
tion would slowly leave the Soviets behind.
In a few other matters the Soviets were equally
unsuccessful. In Greece, despite the continuation of the
devastating civil war, with Western help the Greek non-
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communists were resisting the communists successfully. In
Italy the communists did not get as many votes as they had
hoped and Western ideology was on the increase. When the
Soviets put pressure on Turkey, the U.S. reinforced the
American naval presence including a marine force which had
been sailing in the Mediterranean, and deployed the USS
Franklin D. Roosevelt, the most powerful American aircraft
carrier, to the area. These moves caused the Soviets to ease
their pressure on Turkey considerably. Also during the Berlin
blockade, an airlift was started by the West and continued
resolutely without any sign of weakening. When Stalin saw
that the blockade accomplished nothing and only endangered his
forces he lifted it. These setbacks for the Kremlin presented
opportunities to the West, for they showed that with resolve
and unity the non- communist countries could stop Soviet expan-
sion.
D. THE INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT IN 1949 (STEP 4)
The internal conditions of the Western European countries
also give insight to the questions of why and how NATO was
formed. These conditions, collectively termed the internal
environment, are made up of the strengths and the weaknesses
of the Western countries during the postwar era.
1. Internal strengths of the Western countries
U.S. aid gradually increased the economic and
military strength of the non- communist European countries.
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Two purposes of American aid were to build up Greece and
Turkey and to give relief to the peoples of the other coun-
tries devastated by the war. This aid helped them to recon-
struct their economies. The U.S. also stood ready to support
Western Europe militarily, particularly with its tremendous
strategic bombing capability. It could launch air assaults
into the Soviet Union with both conventional and nuclear
weapons. Although the Soviets knew how to make nuclear
weapons, the U.S. was still the only power that could deliver
them effectively. Besides the U.S., Britain's Royal Air Force
did have a limited offensive capacity outside the British
Isles in addition to their considerable defensive strength.
The Western countries also had the advantage at sea. Beyond
this, another major strength of the Western countries was
their unity. The Western countries were resolved to stick
together no matter what happened. This cohesiveness gave them
the strength to act decisively. They formed the West European
Union in 1948 and eventually signed the North Atlantic Treaty
which linked both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. The North
Atlantic countries thus formed a stout barrier to Soviet
expansion.
2. Internal weaknesses of the Western countries
In 1945 Europe was a wasteland. It is estimated that
the war claimed the lives of 35 million people and displaced
50 million more. The material damage was catastrophic as
well. Nearly 1700 cities were destroyed, communications were
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almost completely disrupted and production facilities were de-
stroyed. [Ref. 14 :p. 3] The countries of Western Europe-
-
England, France, the low countries of Belgium, Netherlands and
Luxembourg, Italy and Germany- -could not by themselves recover
from this devastation quickly enough to resist Soviet expan-
sion. There was not even enough food to provide a basic diet
in any of these countries. Further, industrial production was
too scant to earn foreign currency to supply these countries'
vital needs. And in all but Britain, there were strong
communist parties which exercised significant authority and
were in a position to exploit the situation. [Ref. 15 :p. E-l]
Militarily the situation looked equally poor. The
West could field only 12 divisions and most of these were
poorly equipped and poorly trained. They were deployed not
for defense, but for occupation. They lacked armor and the
supply, engineer, and heavy artillery forces which give an
army its mobility and striking ability. There were few
prepared defensive positions and not enough ammunition in the
whole theater to last more than a few weeks. Supply lines for
both the British and the Americans ran not perpendicular to
the front but parallel to it, an undesirable strategic
situation. Further, there were not enough airfields in the
proper positions to support tactical air operations. [Ref.
16:pp. 14-15]
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E. ALTERNATIVE FUTURE ENVIRONMENTS (STEPS 3 & 4 CONTINUED)
The approach that planners took toward these problems
could today be described as scenario building, resulting in
alternative futures. This is how the environment may possibly
change in the future. Three of these scenarios were particu-
larly important.
The first alternative future was a scenario where the
Soviets would mount a simultaneous attack on Central, Southern
and Northern Europe. Given the massive land forces of the
Soviet Union and its satellites described in the last section,
this presented a grave threat to Western Europe. The scenario
was envisioned as follows: the Soviets would begin by invading
Central Europe. Western troops would form a defensive line on
the Rhine River, but with only twelve divisions would probably
be unable to hold it, especially since the Soviets forces'
center of gravity would lie on this axis. Although the
creaking Soviet economy would not be able to support as great
a war production as the United States, the Red Army would
attempt, by moving west only a few hundred miles from its
present position, to crush the Western defense line and engulf
West Germany, the world's greatest potential war production
center outside the U.S. They would simultaneously launch an
attack towards the Turkish straits, thereby dominating the
Mediterranean and ultimately part of the Atlantic Ocean by
means of the Soviet Navy. In these areas they would attack
vulnerable lines of communications and, by overwhelming Iran,
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would reach the oil-producing areas of the Middle East. They
would also launch air attacks against the British Isles in
order to prevent the United Kingdom from being used as an
effective allied base of operations. The Soviet Union might
also be able to prevent any allied "Normandy type" amphibious
operations intended to force a reentry into the continent of
Europe. After completing the initial campaigns and consoli-
dating its positions in the Western Europe, the Soviet Union
would then conduct simultaneous full-scale air and limited sea
operations against the British Isles and invade the Iberian
and Scandinavian peninsulas. Soviet forces would also conduct
an airborne operation in Alaska. Using air bases in Alaska,
Soviet bombers would be within striking range of the huge U.S
industrial areas in and around Detroit. Even without Alaska,
the Soviet position in the Kurils and Sakhalin Islands put
them in a position to bomb much of the Western U.S., including
the nuclear weapons production plant at Hanford, Washington.
A quantitative forecast was also conducted at that time.
According to that forecast the Soviet Union was projected to







The Soviet Union was also developing aircraft able to deliver
these atomic bombs. When the Soviet Union's atomic stockpile
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increased, it would be able to damage the Allied cause in
three significant ways: laying waste the British Isles, thus
depriving the Western Powers of their forward base; destroying
the vital centers of Western Europe and its communications,
thus preventing effective defense by the Western powers; and
delivering devastating attacks on certain vital centers of the
United States and Canada.
The second scenario was the domination of Italy by the
Communist Party and the deployment of Soviet troops to that
country. Soviet control of Italy would mean that Soviet
aircraft and submarines could hinder and even deny to the U.S.
access to North Africa, Turkey and Syria. These areas would
be critically needed as bases for the U.S. to mount an air
attack on the Russian heartland. Deeper bases in Saudi
Arabia, the Sudan and Kenya would also be menaced by a
communist Italy.
The third scenario saw the Soviet Union stirring up the
Arab countries against the West, thereby disrupting the all-
important flow of oil to Western Europe and the U.S. [Note:
these scenarios adapted from Refs 17 and 18]
F. THE STRATEGIC ISSUES (STEP 5)
Based on the analysis of the present and future environ-
ments above, two strategic issues remained paramount. These
were the same as the ones first identified as NATO's mandates
and mission.
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The first strategic issue these countries faced was how
to defeat a Soviet attack and defend their territory success-
fully. If an organization was to be formed, its main objec-
tives, then, must be to safeguard the freedom, common heritage
and civilization of the peoples of these countries and to
develop plans to take joint military action if necessary.
Failure to address this issue could mean the overrunning the
Western territory by the Soviet forces and the resulting
destruction of the Western institutions.
The second strategic issue was perhaps even more impor-
tant: how to deter the Soviets from attacking in the first
place. One of the most important tasks of the organization
would be to create a powerful deterrent to any nation or group
of nations threatening Western Europe. Stability and well-
being in Western Europe could only be achieved by capable
deterrence. If war occurred, this objective was lost; Western
Europe could not afford another war.
6. MANDATES REVISITED (STEP 1 COMPLETED)
All of these factors brought first twelve, then sixteen,
nations together to pledge their efforts toward collective
defense and toward the preservation of peace and security.
These ideas at last took shape in the North Atlantic Treaty,
signed on April 4, 1949, in Washington D.C. By establishing
clear mandates, objectives and principles, the treaty laid the
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foundation for the strategic planning which followed. In
Article 1, the treaty states this overtly:
The parties undertake, as set forth in the charter of
the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in
which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security and justice
are not endangered, and to refrain in their international
relations from threat or use of force in any manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
[Ref. 4:p.l7]
From the start NATO's mandate has been clearly defensive:
NATO will go to war only if attacked, and then only after
peaceful means proved insufficient. Article 6 codifies this:
An armed attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to
include an armed attack on the territory of any of the
parties in Europe and North America . . . or on the
vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.
[Ref. 4:p. 18]
This article draws the boundaries of the area in which NATO
can act and reiterates that NATO will act only if an attack is
made against one or more of its members. The mandate is even
more fully defined in Article 7:
This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted
as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under
the charter of the parties which are members of the United
Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security
Council for the maintenance of international peace and
security. [Ref. 4:p. 18]
According to this article parties must obey the principles of
the United Nations and are not authorized to assume the
responsibilities of the U.N. Security Council.
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H. MISSION REVISITED (STEP 2 COMPLETED)
Likewise, NATO's mission, though not overtly stated, was
clearly implied. First, the elements of a stakeholder
analysis were completed. By default the member countries and
their populations were the main stakeholders, since their
peace and prosperity, even their very existence, depended on
the success of NATO to deter war or to win if deterrence
failed. The stakeholders had just endured a terrible war and
they saw success as peace and freedom while seeing failure as
war or foreign domination. NATO's mission was to bring about
the hopes of these stakeholders.
While the founders of the Alliance did not create an
official mission statement for NATO, if they had written one
it might have read as follows (The reader may find it helpful
to refer to the elements of the mission statement in Chapter
II, section D)
:
The parties agree to this North Atlantic Treaty. The
treaty exists to safeguard the freedom, common heritage
and civilization of their peoples, founded on the princi-
ples of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.
The organization will achieve this by coordinating, in
time of peace, member nations' military and economic
strengths in order to create a powerful deterrent to any
nation or group of nations threatening them. The organi-
zation will develop plans for war, which will provide for
the combined employment of military forces available to
the Alliance nations to counter enemy threats and to
defend and maintain the peoples and home territories of
the Alliance nations. Members will consult together
whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial
integrity, political independence, or security of the
parties is threatened. Our aim is to promote the stabili-
ty and the well-being of the Alliance area.
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Members will contribute toward the further development of
peaceful and friendly international relations by strength-
ening their free institutions, and by bringing about
better understanding of the principles upon which these
institutions are founded.
An armed attack on one or more of them shall be considered
an attack against them all and consequently, if such an
armed attack occurs, all parties will assist the party or
the parties attacked including the use of armed forces if
necessary to restore and maintain the security of the
Alliance area.
This treaty broke new ground. Never before had both
sides of Atlantic pledged themselves to cooperate in peace and
war. Thus, NATO filled a unique role which benefited all its
stakeholders. [Note: this mission statement adapted from Refs
4 and 19]
I. THE STRATEGIES TO MANAGE THE ISSUES (STEP 6)
In order to manage the strategic issues mentioned above
NATO planners developed three defense plans: the Short-Term
Defense Plan, the Medium- Term Plan and the Long-Term or
Requirements Plan.
The Short-Term Plan was an emergency plan whose purpose
was principally to save as many troops as possible in the
event of a sudden war. It assigned withdrawal routes and gave
authority to commandeer ships in British and Allied ports to
be used for evacuation. This was the plan for the immediate
future, the period in which the Allied troops would remain
badly outnumbered on the ground. [Ref. 16 :p 14]
The Medium- Term Defense Plan looked forward to the day
when the allies would have enough troops to perform both
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logistical back-up and to deploy in combat in the front lines.
The first task therefore was to improve the logistical
infrastructure by shifting the supply lines perpendicular to
the front, building new airfields in the proper tactical
positions, establishing supply dumps and hospitals, and
fleshing out the corps and army supporting troops. When these
steps were complete, the NATO forces could be redeployed to
positions from which they would move to battle and offer a
credible fight, even before they reached full strength. What
planners envisioned was a withdrawal behind a screen of
mechanized cavalry units to positions behind the Rhine, since,
if war came during this interim period there was still little
chance of holding at the Rhine. [Ref. 16: pp. 14-15] Whereas
the Short-Term Plan was one of rapid evacuation, the Medium-
Term Plan involved an orderly fighting retreat.
The Long-Term Plan was a requirement -driven one, in other
words an analysis of the forces required to defend Europe in
a major war without needing to retreat. There were three
different requirements to be considered. First, forces were
needed to cover the major approaches. Second, forces were
required which could screen the intervening areas between the
approaches. Third, a reserve had to be provided of roughly
one- third of the total force. Calculations were made for the
whole front and the result was 96 divisions. These recommen-
dations were officially approved at the Lisbon meeting of the
North Atlantic Council in 1952. Even as they voted, most of
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the members knew that there was only one way for NATO to reach
this number- -by rearming Germany. Most European countries
were very reluctant to do this, but the communist attack on
South Korea convinced them that the Soviets were eager to use
military force to achieve their ambitions. Accordingly, they
decided to rebuild Germany's military force within the context
of NATO. Although this decision was made in 1950, pressure
from France and a few other member countries delayed Germany's
membership in NATO until 1954.
The addition of Germany in NATO would allow them to raise
additional divisions, but there were two more critical needs.
First, a new infrastructure would have to be built including
headquarters, communication networks, airfields, fuel
pipelines, radar stations, and port facilities, all of which
stand behind a modern army. Second, a doctrine acceptable to
the front-line states of Germany, Denmark and The Netherlands.
Understandably, these countries would have little incentive to
fight if NATO plans included withdrawing from all but the
extreme western parts of their countries. The answer to this
concern was the concept of "forward defense." This was a
promise to the Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands to hold
the line at the Rhine, or as far east as possible. A further
reason for forward defense was that with the advent of the
atomic bomb it would be hard to conduct Normandy- -type
landings to liberate Europe again. Therefore, the enemy
invasion would have to be stopped short of complete occupa-
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tion. [Ref . 16:pp. 15-19] This forward conventional defense,
with 96 divisions positioned as far east as possible, was the
main NATO strategy for managing the strategic issues during
the early 1950s.
J. MODIFIED STRATEGIES RESULTING FROM ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES
By 1954 it became apparent that with even Turkey, Greece
and the Federal Republic of Germany as members of NATO it
would be impossible for the alliance, given the economic
strength and political will it had at the time, to reach these
force goals. Excessive military expenditures by the alliance
countries could endanger their economies and achieve for the
Kremlin its objective of destroying the West through economic
collapse. [Ref. 14 :p. 59] Thus the two main weaknesses of the
Alliance, besides its continuing numerical inferiority to the
East Bloc ground forces, were economic and political. At the
same time, however, the United States was strengthening NATO
by rapidly expanding its own nuclear capability beyond its
modest stockpile of first generation atomic bombs. The
availability of smaller, more efficient nuclear weapons, the
development of the hydrogen bomb and the existence of long-
range bombers able to deliver these weapons deep into Soviet
territory constituted a major strength of the Alliance. [Ref.
20: pp. 3-4] Although the threat remained the same, the death
of Stalin and the Soviet Union's lack of a comparable long-
range effective nuclear capability created an opportunity for
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NATO. It could catch up more quickly to the East as Moscow's
expansionism waned and the Alliance enjoyed a large nuclear
advantage
.
Taking into account the new internal and external
environmental factors mentioned above, the new primary
strategic issue became how to maintain and improve the
deterrent and defensive strength of the Alliance at a more
manageable cost.
The planners formulated the "massive retaliation"
strategy to manage this issue. Ministers in 1954 accepted
that the future strategy of the Alliance would depend on
nuclear weapons and so reduced the requirement for the number
of first-line divisions from 96 to 30. [Ref. 20 :p. 5]
Under this new strategy member nations would not have to
maintain conventional forces at a politically and economically
unrealistic level. The basic idea of the strategy was that an
attack on NATO's territory would be met with a worldwide full-
scale nuclear war in which the Soviet Union receive incalcula-
ble damage. This would make any move on Europe so costly that
the aggressor would never attempt it. U.S Secretary of State
John F. Dulles announced this new strategy, saying, "We will
seek to deter the Soviet aggression by having a great capacity
to retaliate instantly, by means and at places of our own
choosing." [Ref. 20 :p. 4] In December 1956 massive retalia-
tion became NATO's official strategy. The role of NATO's
reduced ground force was to hold the line as far forward as
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possible until the massive nuclear retaliation could take
place. [Ref. 20:p. 5]
In the late 1950s and the early 1960s the environment in
which NATO operated changed again. By this time the Soviet
Union had already tested the hydrogen bomb, developed long-
range and medium- range bombers comparable to the B-47 and B-52
and developed an intermediate ballistic missile capability.
And in October 1957, the Soviet Union launched the Sputnik,
the first man-made earth satellite. This event made it clear
that the Soviets were about to develop intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBM) . Such missiles had the capability
of delivering devastating nuclear strikes against major
European and American cities. [Ref. 20:pp. 5-6] This created
a great uneasiness among the member states. A massive nuclear
strike against the Soviet Union would for the first time bring
a comparable attack on the West. A hypothetical war game in
Europe named "Carte Blanche" showed that in an all-out nuclear
war the Western countries, especially Germany, would suffer
extensive civilian casualties. Publication of the casualty
figures aroused widespread fears about the consequences of
NATO's strategy of massive retaliation [Ref. 14:p. 95]. Thus
a new strategic issue arose: how to deter the enemy and
defend NATO's territory without compelling the enemy to use
his strategic nuclear forces.
In the mid-1960s NATO planners reexamined the policy of
massive retaliation in light of this new strategic issue. By
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this time NATO had developed effective conventional forces.
There were 28 divisions on the Central Front, well equipped
and well trained. NATO's tanks, which included the M-60, the
Leopard and the Chieftain, were better than the main Soviet
Bloc tanks, the T-54 and the T-55, although they were still
outnumbered. Also NATO had developed accurate antitank
weapons. Studies performed at the time showed that NATO's
tanks and antitank weapons had a high kill ratio against
Soviet bloc tank forces. In addition, NATO had estimate a
high kill ratio in tactical aircraft and armed helicopters.
[Ref . 21: pp. 148-149] Furthermore, NATO had also developed an
impressive infrastructure for command and logistical support.
All of these together gave NATO considerable conventional
power. Given the increasing external nuclear threat and its
new internal strengths, NATO no longer felt forced to rely on
the policy of massive retaliation. Under pressure from its
stakeholders, the member nations' governments and peoples,
NATO adopted the policy of "flexible response".
Flexible response was a compromise between local
conventional resistance, graduated nuclear response and
massive nuclear retaliation. The essence of the new strategy
adopted in December, 1967, was summarized by J. Michael Legge:
This strategy seeks to deter aggression by the maintenance
of conventional, theater nuclear and strategic nuclear
forces that would enable the Alliance to respond to any
attack at an appropriate level. The initial response
would be direct defense, seeking to defeat the aggression
on the level at which the enemy has chosen to fight. If
the aggression could not be contained, the Alliance would
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be prepared to conduct a deliberate escalation, raising
but where possible controlling the scope and intensity of
combat, with the aim of making the cost and risk dispro-
portionate to the aggressor's objectives and the threat of
nuclear response more imminent. The ultimate objective,
if deterrence failed, would be to convince the aggressor
of the unacceptable degree of risk involved, thus causing
him to cease his attack and withdraw. Finally, in the
event of a major nuclear attack, NATO would maintain a




This chapter has shown that NATO planners followed the
essential elements of each step of the strategic planning
model described in Chapter II as they formed and guided NATO
through its first forty years. The incredible events of the
last three years, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
unshackling of its satellites, have served to validate NATO's
strategy in a way that tens of thousands of strategic planning
documents could not. NATO achieved peace through strength,
and its strength was the result of sound planning and
determined work. By implication this model, which emulates
this planning process, is also sound, and can be successfully
used again to meet the new challenges NATO faces today.
In the remaining chapters this is exactly what will be
done. Steps 1 through 6 of the model will be applied to
NATO's current situation, resulting in a new strategy for the
1990s and beyond.
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IV. THE ENVIRONMENT OF NATO IN 1992
A. INTRODUCTION
In the last three years NATO's external environment has
changed more radically than at any time since the end of World
War II. Significant changes have occurred in the internal
environment as well . NATO must understand these changes in
order to respond to them. This chapter briefly considers the
mandates and mission of NATO and then examines in detail these
important internal and external environmental changes
.
B. MANDATES AND MISSION (STEPS 1 & 2)
NATO's mandates and mission remain essentially the same
as before the collapse of the Soviet empire- -to defend the
countries of Western Europe against armed attack and to
promote the stability and well-being of the Alliance area.
However, in a new multipolar world rather than the bipolar
world of the Cold War era, NATO must reexamine its narrow
geographic limits in responding to threats. As before, these
two steps will again be revisited in Chapter VI, after the
present environment of NATO and possible future developments
have been analyzed.
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C. THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT IN 1992 (STEP 3)
1. Opportunities
The changing situation in the USSR and in its East
European satellites have given opportunities to NATO that were
unimaginable in the past. These opportunities are principally
the result of political and military developments that have
occurred in the USSR and in the Eastern European countries
since 1989. First, NATO can now begin to achieve its primary
objective of ensuring its countries' security through politi-
cal reforms in the countries which were its enemies by
creating a useful dialogue with them. Second, now that the
major threat of a surprise attack has vanished, NATO can
channel many more of its resources to benefiting its citizens
and building its economic base instead of maintaining a large
military machine. Third, since the new united Germany has
remained in NATO and it will eventually be much stronger, the
rest of the alliance will eventually have to shoulder less of
the burden of NATO's defense. The first two parts of this
section describe the developments which made these opportuni-
ties possible. The third and final part summarizes the
implications and benefits of these events for NATO.
a. Political changes in the USSR and Eastern
Europe
In March 19 85 Mikhail Gorbachev became the
General Secretary of the Communist party of the Soviet Union
and so assumed the highest post in the country. Sovietologist
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Sewerny Bialer describes the situation of the USSR at that
time:
The universe in which Gorbachev took the reins of the
Soviet Union was one in which his country had no major
friends and was strapped with an unruly and economically
and politically sick 'alliance' of satellites and semi-
satellites. The evaluation of the existing situation by
the new leadership led to the beginning of major revisions
and Soviet thought and actions with regard to their
security and foreign policy. [Ref. 22 :p. 457]
Several factors drove the Soviet leadership to
adopt the new policies of "perestroika" , an economic and
political restructuring plan, and "glasnost , " a policy of
openness to cut through the layers of smothering bureaucracy
and corruption and allow innovation. First of all, the Soviet
Union was in an economic crisis. In the 1980s economic growth
rates and productivity growth declined sharply. The resulting
economic situation was gloomy. The performance of the Soviet
economy in the early 1980s has been accurately described as
"stagnant", "decaying" and "faltering". Shortages were
commonplace; consumers had to wait several hours in long lines
to buy basic goods such as food and clothing. The few
consumer goods that were available were of poor quality and
very expensive. The food harvest had been poor and there were
various shortfalls in industrial production as well as
tremendous problems in the distribution system. [Ref. 23 :p.
266] Soviet central planning, production quotas and artifi-
cial prices served well enough to rebuild heavy industries
after World War II, but the system failed to adjust to a
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consumer economy and to promote creativity for a high- technol-
ogy world [Ref. 24:p. 40]. To make matters worse these
domestic economic crises coincided with the development of the
Third Industrial Revolution abroad. This explosion of
technological growth in America, Europe and Asia widened the
economic and technological gap between the USSR and the
capitalist world at an ever- increasing rate.
The USSR's problems were not just in the economy,
however. There were also political, social, ideological and
cultural crises as well. The political system was in a state
of breakdown. The flow of authority from the center outward
and the flow of information from the peripheries to the center
were seriously disrupted. Nearly all segments of the popula-
tion had serious complaints about the regime. The profession-
al and middle classes were being ignored and were denied
access to power. Thus, there was a void of skilled profes-
sionals in the decision-making bodies of the country. Also
there were grave social problems such as alcoholism, corrup-
tion, a shortage in medical services and a decline of the work
ethic. [Ref. 25:p. 292]
Soviet authorities understood well that only
fundamental reforms would allow them to cope with these
problems . The main barrier to them lay in securing the
necessary resources to perform the restructuring. The Soviet
government realized that the country must reduce its interna-
tional commitments, eliminate the tension and confrontation
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with the West and reduce arms spending. The USSR could no
longer afford the strategic arms race, which required a huge
military at home and abroad.
At the same time similar conditions existed in
the satellite countries . Like Soviet citizens, the people in
these countries blamed the communist system for their problems
and wanted to get rid of it. To Gorbachev the satellites
merely compounded his problems as they were a military and
economic drain and a source of political instability. He
decided to cut his losses by letting them go their own way.
[Ref . 24 :p. 40] In 1988 he declared his intention in a speech
to the United Nations, saying, "freedom of choice is a univer-
sal principle." [Ref. 26:p. 42] This began a process of
political revolution in Eastern Europe which went forward at
a dizzying speed. The effects of Gorbachev's reforms in
Eastern European countries were immediate and took one of two
forms. In some countries the top levels of government
acknowledged the fundamental shortcomings of the system and
initiated democratic reforms. In others, reform came from the
bottom up. The common people bravely called attention to the
crimes perpetrated by the system and by public demonstrations
urged the ruling elite to accept democratic reforms. In the
past this kind of popular uprising would have been brutally
suppressed by Soviet forces as occurred in Hungary in 1956 and
in Czechoslovakia in 1968. But this time Gorbachev promised
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not to intervene. This promise became a virtual invitation to
revolt.
Gorbachev handled each of these two situations
differently. Where the governments had initiated reforms, as
in Hungary, Gorbachev gave public approval to their plans.
Where the communist governments resisted change, as in Poland,
Gorbachev withdrew his support from those governments and
urged them to recognize the will of the people. In a Warsaw
Pact meeting in Bucharest in July 1989, Gorbachev canceled the
Brezhnev Doctrine which had stated, "When forces hostile to
socialism seek to reverse the development of a Socialist
country whatsoever. . . this [becomes] the concern of all
socialist countries." [Ref. 26:p. 42] Gorbachev instead said,
"Each people determines the future of its own country and
chooses its own form of society. There must be no interfer-
ence from outside, no matter what the pretext." [Ref.
26: p. 42] Extraordinary events in Eastern Europe soon unfold-
ed.
On January 11, 19 89 in Hungary, a country in
which the communist party was the only legal party, parliament
voted to allow independent parties. On January 15 in Prague,
Czechoslovakia, thousands of demonstrators gathered to condemn
the suppression of the 1968 Czech uprising. The next month in
Warsaw, Polish officials met for the first time with Solidari-
ty, the banned independent trade union. One month later in
Budapest, the communist justice minister stated that the
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Hungary was ready for democracy and for free elections, adding
that he was drafting a Western- style constitution which would
secure the freedoms of speech, association and private
property. On April 18 in Warsaw, the talks between the
government and Solidarity ended and the government legalized
the union and agreed to hold open elections. In June Solidar-
ity won overwhelmingly the East Bloc's first contested
elections in 40 years. The morning after the Polish election
communist leader Jaruzelski admitted, "Our defeat is total."
[Ref . 27 :p. 26] Within three weeks Solidarity's representa-
tives took their seats in parliament. Solidarity quickly
consolidated its victory by declaring the first non- communist
government in Eastern Europe. In an ironic reversal, one-time
political prisoners became government ministers overnight.
And in the most stunning development of all, on September 10,
Hungary suspended its 20 -year border agreement with East
Germany which required Hungary to block the passage of East
Germans to the West. And so The Great Escape from the East to
the West began as the Iron Curtain was swept away. Thousands
of "vacationing" East Germans poured across the frontier,
seeking new lives in West Germany. East German Communist
Party chief Eric Honecker was forced out of office and
replaced by a moderate leader, Egon Krenz. On November 9,
Egon Krenz at last opened the East German border. Moments
after the announcement, people converged on the Berlin Wall,
which had divided the city since 1961, from both sides of the
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city. At 11:17 p.m. Checkpoint Charlie, the symbol of the
East -West division in Europe, was thrown wide open and masses
of East Berliners flooded through the gate to the West. Soon
after, more checkpoints were opened and eventually the wall
was completely demolished.
At the same time in East Germany a new group
opposed to communist rule named the New Forum had been formed
and begun issuing manifestos. In October Hungary's communist
party had formally changed its name, omitting the word
"communist" and adopting the new name Hungarian Socialist
Party. The hard-line party chief was soon ousted and the new
party leadership decided to remove the red star from all
official buildings. On October 23 Hungary declared itself an
independent republic. These events did not bypass Czecho-
slovakia. In December more than half a million Czechs took to
the streets each day. They carried banners, shouted and
honked their car horns to show their desire to oust the
oppressive communist government. Within eight days they
achieved their main objective and communist party leader Milos
Jakes resigned with all the members of the politburo.
Meanwhile the people continued their demonstrations in the
streets for more reforms as a government in which the commu-
nists were in the minority was formed. Czech President Gustav
Husak, who took over after the Soviet invasion in 1968,
resigned. In the last days of December, playwright Vaclav
Havel, who had spent years in prison because of his anti-
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communist ideas, was elected as president by the Czech
parliament. In his New Year message Havel voiced the essence
of the peoples' complaints when he stated, "The state which
calls itself the state of the working people is humiliating
and exploiting the workers." [Ref.28:p. 3 7192] He also
declared that free elections would soon be held.
Bulgaria and Romania were not left out either.
Bulgaria's hard-line leader Todor Zivkov was suddenly ousted.
Zivkov had especially repressed the Turkish minority in the
Eastern part of the country, forcing ethnic Turks to change
their names and placing severe restrictions on religion. In
the summer of 1989 he expelled nearly 300,000 ethnic Turks to
Turkey. His ouster represented a major victory for the people
of Bulgaria. In Romania, dictator Nicolae Ceaucescu was
overthrown and executed after bloody clashes between Ceaucescu
loyalist and reformers. A party called the National Salvation
Front took power in Romania in the early days of 1990 and
promised free elections.
By any measure 1989 had been an astonishing year.
By year's end no hard-line communist government remained in
power in all of Eastern Europe. In 1990 democratic and
economic reforms continued in the Eastern European countries.
1990 has been called the year of free multiparty
elections in Eastern Europe. Elections were held in March and
April in Hungary, in May in Romania and in June in Czechoslo-
vakia and Bulgaria. In all these countries but Bulgaria non-
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socialist parties won the elections. In Bulgaria's elections,
the Socialist Party (formerly the communists) won the elec-
tions but for the first time ethnic Turks gained a voice in
the government as they won 23 seats in the parliament.
The most momentous event of the year, however,
was the reunification of Germany. With the communist East
German government finally out of power, reunification was
possible for the first time. By late 1990, the Soviet -imposed
artificial division of Germany was almost dissolved. The one
roadblock to formal reunification was Soviet resistance to
giving up its precious military bulwark in East Germany. But
Gorbachev's non-interference policy had made the Soviet
decision for them and the Soviets soon acceded to this as
well, promising to withdraw their troops by 1994. West German
chancellor Helmut Kohl vigorously advanced the reunification
issue and gained support for it in both Germanies . In the
March 18th East German general election the Alliance for
Germany, which favored reunification, won a majority of seats
in the East German parliament. Talks immediately began
between the East and West German governments and the four
victorious Allied powers of the second World War (France,
England, the U.S. and the Soviet Union) came together to
reunite the two Germanies. These were named the Two-plus-Four
talks. Initially there was strong Soviet opposition on this
issue, with the Soviet Union insisting that the united Germany
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must join no alliance. But the Western countries including
Germany itself wanted Germany to remain in NATO.
In July West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl met
with Soviet President Gorbachev in Stavropol. Gorbachev
finally agreed to NATO membership for the united Germany by
announcing, "The united Germany, sovereign in every way, will
say to which bloc it wants to belong." [Ref. 29 :p. 37659] In
return, Germany would assist the ill Soviet economy in various
ways, including the sharing of technology. On October 3,
1990, unification at last took place by the accession of East
Germany under Article 23 of the West German Basic Law, and the
rights over Germany of the four victors of World War II were
terminated. In December All -German general elections were
held, the parliament of the united Germany was convened and
Helmut Kohl became the new country's first chancellor. This
event ended 45 years of artificial division of Europe and with
it the ever-present East -West confrontation. As 1990 ended
democracy was taking root in Eastern Europe.
The year 1991 witnessed unprecedented change in
the Soviet Union. The Baltic Republics had already declared
their independence and proclaimed the supremacy of their laws
over Soviet law. At first Moscow refused to recognize this
movement as legitimate, in fact declaring it unlawful. In
1991 other republics, however, also took the same path and
declared their independence. Even the Russian Federation
declared its independence from the Soviet Union. The Soviet
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central government was facing enormous economic problems, and
now major political problems compounded the trouble. Soviet
president Mikhail Gorbachev tried desperately to find ways to
ease the economic problems while keeping the Union together.
Gorbachev even went to London where the world's seven greatest
capitalist countries were meeting and demanded Western
economic help. Gorbachev envisioned a reformed Soviet Union
which would be a loose confederation of sovereign states under
communist guidance. With this plan, however, Gorbachev landed
in the unenviable position of satisfying neither side. The
hard-liners took their turn first as the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union engineered a coup in Moscow, seizing power
for 72 hours in August 1991. The people of Moscow as well as
the people across the Soviet Union took to the streets and
protested the coup. The coup leaders ordered a crackdown, but
this time the Soviet military did not obey. Commanders of key
units such as the Air Force, the Air Force Paratroopers, the
Baltic fleet and the KGB Alpha anti- terrorist group simply
ignored the coup leaders. As a result the coup failed and the
coup leaders were arrested. On August 29, because of the
party's role in the failed coup, Soviet lawmakers suspended
the Soviet Communist Party's activities nationwide and froze
its bank accounts. Soviet Communism, which had been the cause
of tens of millions of brutal murders and incomprehensible
human suffering, had breathed its last.
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Now it was the reformers' turn and events moved
quickly. Russia and Ukraine bypassed the Kremlin to form a
military and economic alliance. On September 2, the Congress
of People's Deputies approved a plan to reduce the Kremlin's
authority in the Soviet Union. Three days later, Soviet
lawmakers approved an interim government to usher in a
confederation of sovereign states; the next day the Soviet
Union officially recognized the independence of Latvia,
Lithuania and Estonia. On November 16, Russian President
Boris Yeltsin took control of the Soviet money supply and its
stocks of oil, gold, diamonds and foreign currency. In
December, Ukraine voters approved a referendum declaring
independence. Russia, Ukraine and Byelorussia formed a
"Commonwealth" and declared Mr. Gorbachev's government dead.
[Ref . 30: p. A- 8] On December 25, truly a Christmas to remem-
ber, Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev resigned from his post
and the Soviet flag was replaced by the Russian flag on the
roof of the Kremlin. So the Soviet Union, a gigantic state
which had attempted to dominate the whole of Europe, passed
into history, its ideology as bankrupt as the economy it had
destroyed.
Jb. Militaury changes in the USSR and Eastern Eu-
rope
The Soviet Union had signed the Intermediate
-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with the U.S. in 1987, as a result
of which the Soviets destroyed 1766 medium range and 668
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shorter range missiles together with 819 launchers and 3 7
missile bases. As described above, Gorbachev desperately-
needed resources to rebuild the bankrupt Soviet economy.
Since more than 25 percent of his spending was going into
defense, he decided he must cut military expenditures. He
then introduced two security policies to do this- - "reasonable
sufficiency" and the "defensive doctrine" [Ref . 31 :p. 19] . In
an interview in 1989, Soviet Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev
outlined the new Soviet military policy:
We proceed from the position that the foreign policy of
the Soviet Union is based on demilitarization. The use of
force is ruled out, except when someone confronts the
Soviet Union from a position of strength. [Ref 32 :p. 60]
Marshal Akhromeyev connected the two concepts:
The defensive charter of Soviet military doctrine mani-
fests itself in the fact that the Soviet Union resolutely
advocates maintaining the balance of military forces at
the lowest possible level, reducing military potentials to
levels of sufficiency necessary for defense. [Ref. 31 :p.
67]
Another Soviet Army General, A. D. Lizichev, stated:
[The] defensive doctrine . . . is a principle of reason-
able sufficiency. What does it consist of? It consists
of . . . general purpose forces being maintained at the
minimum level which will enable us to preserve political
stability and make our country safe from the strike of an
aggressor. [Ref. 31:pp. 67-68]
Soviet Colonel G. Ionin summed up the new Soviet doctrinal
thinking, saying, "Soviet military doctrine ... is thorough-
ly defensive in nature. This means that we will not begin
military operations if we are not subjected to armed attack."
[Ref. 31:p. 71]
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Soviet propaganda had always proclaimed the
defensive nature of their forces while their actions went into
building massive offensive forces. Now, however, the Soviets
immediately put this new policy into action by cutting their
military spending and reducing the number of their troops. By
October 1989 the Soviets withdrew the following forces from
Eastern Europe [Ref. 33:p.l050]:
3 tank divisions





With the fall of all the communist governments in
Eastern Europe, this withdrawal accelerated significantly.
Moscow agreed to withdraw all forces from Poland, Hungary and
Czechoslovakia, and by June 1991, this was completed in
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Troop withdrawals from Poland are
not yet complete but the troops that remain there are not
strategically significant. Moscow also agreed with the new
united Germany to withdraw its remaining 370,000 troops from
the former East Germany by 1994. On April 1, 1991, the Warsaw
pact, created in 1955 as Moscow's counterbalance to NATO but
soon the instrument of Soviet control over its satellites in
Eastern Europe, was dissolved. Deep cuts have been made in
Soviet forces stationed at home and the new Commonwealth of
Independent States (C.I.S.) plans to cut military personnel by
700,000 and to reduce the number of tanks and river crossing
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equipment in each division. Furthermore, talks are in
progress between the U.S. and Commonwealth members to reduce
the number of multiple -warhead ballistic missiles.
TIME Magazine describes well the current situa-
tion of the former Soviet military:
Conscription has broken down in some areas, and the
desertion rate is rising. Pay is so meager that soldiers
have resorted to selling military equipment on the black
market. Fuel shortages are so dire that many ships and
submarines have been forced to return to their home ports.
Planes, ships and tanks are being cannibalized for spare
parts. Thousands of demobilized troops from Eastern
Europe are stranded without adequate housing and benefits
in shabby tent cities. Morale is at nadir. [Ref. 34 :p.
28]
Dr. R. Laba of the Naval Postgraduate School visited the
former Soviet Union from June 1991 to January 1992. Dr.
Laba's comment was perhaps the best description of all: "The
Red Army as we know it is dead."
c. Implications for the West
All of these events have created a climate
tremendously favorable for the West, which faced down with the
Soviet bloc for 45 years. The ideological and political
threats from the East which loomed so large for so long have
dissolved completely and the military threat, while not gone
completely, has receded greatly. Most significantly, by
pulling out of Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union lost
its base from which it could launch a surprise attack on
Western Europe. Before, 19 to 20 Russian divisions in East
Germany were ready to march west within a few hours' notice.
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There were 11 more Russian divisions stationed in Poland,
Hungary and Czechoslovakia to augment the first line troops.
The Eastern European countries had placed 17 divisions at the
disposal of the Russians, and they were ready to march
immediately. Thus NATO would have faced 47 divisions which
could storm across its borders within 24 hours. In the days
following the initial assault, the Russians could have brought
60 more divisions from the western parts of the USSR. Soviet
combat forces and logistical units could have used the
transportation systems in the Eastern European countries
without resistance. Added to this grim picture were short-
range and medium- range nuclear missiles deployed in Eastern
Europe. Within a week or so of the beginning of a surprise
attack, more than 100 divisions could have crossed into
Western Europe. Now, however, there is no possibility of a
surprise conventional attack. Substantial numbers of former
Soviet troops have left Eastern Europe and a forward launching
area for Russian forces no longer exists. Since Russia has no
longer any control over Eastern Europe, they no longer have
unopposed access to the logistical facilities in these
countries. If Russia or any other Commonwealth members
attempt to attack NATO, they will have to bring most of their
forces hundreds or even thousands of miles. In this they will
face at least some resistance from the Eastern European
countries. All this adds up to a warning time which has
increased from hours to about six months. Further, Russian
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medium- range nuclear weapons are no longer deployed in Europe
and it is doubtful that the government of Russia could
mobilize civilian and military personnel for war. A general
war in Europe is unlikely, certainly less likely now than at
any time in NATO's history.
NATO's new opportunities spring directly from
these favorable events. By encouraging its former enemies to
solve their disputes by political means, NATO can have a great
and long- lasting democratizing influence, which will yield
long-term security benefits. Resources which were poured into
military defense may now be channeled into civilian economic
growth. And with a powerful new United Germany now in NATO,
the other members' defense burden will ease.
2 . Threats
The greatest former threat to NATO, a surprise
Russian attack simultaneously on all of its fronts, has
vanished. However, political and economic instabilities and
other uncertainties, along with the danger of proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, have created new threats which
NATO must consider.
a. Instabilities in the former Soviet Union
One of the areas of greatest potential problems
for NATO is the former Soviet Union itself. Although this
once massive state has collapsed and the "republics" which
once formed the Union have actually gained their independence,
there are power vacuums everywhere as military and political
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authority breaks down. The economic situation is grave. The
people have great difficulty getting food, housing and
medicine, and as a result the standard of living is declining
sharply. In the areas where defense industries are located,
the populace is uneasy because these factories may close. In
some areas this is critical as the economies of entire cities
are based on military spending. Scientists employed in the
defense industries are facing the loss of their jobs and cuts
in military personnel levels have caused yet another problem
as soldiers return to their homes with little chance of
finding jobs. In the Russian Federation, the largest of the
former republics, President Yeltsin has little control over
all these matters. To make things worse, increasing ethnic
violence within the Russian Federation and even more splin-
tering of this state is probable. Some right-wing extremists
may be able to exploit Yeltsin's weak position and mount yet
another coup. If this happens, given current economic
hardships, the probability of success of a coup is now much
higher than ever before. Added to all this are political
conflicts and the real possibility of armed clashes between
the members of the Commonwealth. Armenia and Azerbaijan are
engaged in a bloody war which has claimed thousands of lives.
The Commonwealth meanwhile seems powerless to act. In the
meeting of the Commonwealth's heads of state in March 1992,
leaders were unable to reach an agreement on how to begin to
solve the Commonwealth's pressing problems, including military
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issues. Russian Federation President Yeltsin announced in
late March that the Russia would form its own military and it
is quite possible that the other former republics will follow
suit. If these states, many still equipped with modern Soviet
military hardware including tactical nuclear weapons, should
collapse politically, the danger to NATO would be grave. New
leaders who might be irresponsible, inexperienced and adven-
turous could reconstitute a serious direct military threat to
NATO in a short time. Also, if an internal war breaks out in
the Commonwealth, it would likely be more violent than any the
region has ever known. This kind of war could spill over to
NATO in short order.
Jb. Instabilities in Eastern Europe
As if the potential threats from the former
Soviet Union were not enough, Eastern Europe provides many of
its own. Because Eastern Europe by definition is so close to
Western Europe, the threats here may be even greater than the
threats from the former Soviet Union. Each country in Eastern
Europe has a host of internal and external problems
.
Internal economic problems are severe. There is
antipathy among unemployed workers, demobilized troops and
many others whose personal welfare is endangered. There is
questionable loyalty among senior military officers and an
uncertain relationship between civil and military authorities.
The officers corps and the leaders in the military- industrial
complexes of these countries have long desired to control
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national security policy. The people distrust, even despise,
politics and the politicians in general, which hinders the
democratic process even more.
Adding to the internal problems is the splinter-
ing of these countries which began with the end of Soviet
control . Yugoslavia witnessed a bloody civil war between its
two states of Croatia and Serbia. A cease fire has been
holding intermittently and U.N peace keeping forces have been
deployed, but in spite of this scattered military clashes are
still occurring. Because of the mixed ethnic composition and
corresponding unstable politics in the region, the same sort
of thing may occur in the other countries of the region as
well
.
The end of Soviet control has created external
problems as well. There is a dispute between Poland, Byelo-
russia, Ukraine and Lithuania over the territories Poland lost
after World War II. Polish nationalists are keeping this
issue alive while former Soviet republics continue to reject
Polish claims. Another problem exists between Hungary and
Romania. Hungary claims that 1.5 to 2.3 ethnic Hungarians in
Romania Transylvania have been denied their rights. Romania
denies this and interprets this as interference in its own
internal affairs. There are similar problems between Yugosla-
via and both Albania and Bulgaria. In the first case, ninety
percent of the population of Kosova, an autonomous province of
Serbia that borders Albania, is composed of ethnic Albanians
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who are denied political autonomy and victims of social and
economic deprivation. Serbs charge that Albania is conspiring
with Kosova's Albanian majority to annex the province. In the
second case, there has been pressure for the government of
Yugoslavia to recognize Macedonia as an independent Republic.
In March 1992, Macedonia proclaimed its independence from
Yugoslavia. Some analysts believe that Bulgaria may try to
incorporate independent Macedonia or that a resurgent Macedo-
nia could claim parts of Bulgaria.
Ethnic conflicts on such as these which occur on
international borders are particularly inflammatory since
large military forces are often present and international
politics becomes involved. Border disputes, revolutions and
wars could spill over into NATO countries or involve outside
powers, which changes the power equation in the region. Added
to this is the prospect of tens of millions of refugees
fleeing to Western Europe. NATO must consider each of these
threats. [This section is adapted from Ref . 35:pp. 137-158]
c. Instabilities in the Middle East
The Middle East has rightly been described as a
giant powder keg ready to explode into war at the slightest
spark. Although an analysis of the region's political and
military conflicts is far beyond the scope of this thesis,
some brief comments are in order, since nearly all NATO member
countries depend on Middle East oil and Turkey, a NATO member,
shares a border each with Syria, Iraq and Iran.
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Several factors contribute to instability in the
region. The first is that most of these countries have little
or no experience in democracy , A quick glance at the recent
history of the region shows why. The Middle East was ruled by
Ottoman Turks for 400 years. After World War I when the
Ottoman Empire collapsed, the region was dominated by the
French and British. Foreign forces evacuated the region after
World War II and the countries at last gained full indepen-
dence, but democracy never took root in Arab countries of the
region. In 14 Arab countries there have been 81 military coup
attempts, 24 of which were successful. The three largest Arab
states of the region- -Egypt, Syria and Iraq- -are each ruled by
one strongman; there are also monarchies in two other major
Arab states, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Since these rulers
answer to no one, these governments do not have the stability
inherent in a democratic government with checks and balances.
As the events surrounding the recent Gulf War showed, it is
hard to predict what these rulers will do, and this unpredict-
ability undermines stability in the region.
The second factor contributing to instability in
the region is the division of the Arab world. Under the
facade of "Arab Unity" each strongman in the region is eager
to dominate the entire Arab world and a few are willing to
take great risks to do it. When Saddam Hussein of Iraq
calculated that he had enough power to realize this dream, he
did not hesitate to act by invading Kuwait. Any other leader
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in the region might conceivably do the same thing. Aside from
the ambitions of their leaders, the Arab countries do not all
share the same basic goals or methods of reaching them. The
Arabs seem unable to unite in anything with just a few
exceptions, the primary two being opposition to Israel and the
desire to maximize their oil revenues.
The third and probably the most destabilizing
factor is the Arab- Israeli conflict. When the State of Israel
was formed in 1948, the Arab nations did not recognize the
existence of this state and went to war with Israel four
times: in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973. Each time they hoped to
annihilate the Jewish state. Four sound defeats of the
combined Arab armies by a tiny Jewish State, coupled with the
festering Palestinian problem, have increased the animosity
between the Jews and Arabs, if that were possible. At any
time another Arab- Israeli war could break out. Despite U.S.
initiatives to limit arms transfers to the region, China and
North Korea have continued to ship arms to Iran and Syria, two
of the most unpredictable countries, in exchange for needed
hard currency. The transfers from China reportedly include
missiles to Syria and nuclear reactors, nuclear weapons
technology and chemical weapons to Iran. Likewise, North
Korea is reportedly selling Scud missiles to Iran and Syria.
These versions of the Scud can carry larger warheads over a
longer range than the missiles used by Saddam Hussein in the
Gulf War. The combination of mutual hatred, close proximity
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and huge military forces equipped with the latest hi-tech
weapons is enough to frighten anyone.
The fourth factor lies in the influence of two
major Arab countries in North Africa: Libya and Algeria. The
governments of these countries are also unstable and unpre-
dictable. Libya is ruled by Colonel Muammar Kaddafi, certain-
ly no friend of the West. His sponsorship of international
terrorism, illustrated by the bombing of Pan-American flight
103 in 1986, is well known. Kaddafi can be expected to
contribute to any instability in the region to achieve his own
ambitions. Under his direction, Libya is importing chemical
weapons from China and manufacturing some of its own. Because
of Libya's immense oil wealth, any move by Libya can threaten
the entire Mediterranean area. Libya's neighbor to the west,
Algeria, is most noted in the West for its growing Islamic
fundamentalist movement. Islamic parties won recent elections
but the president of Algeria ignored the results and imposed
military rule. The situation is still tense. If Islamic
fundamentalists do succeed in gaining control of Algeria's
government, they may cause trouble with the West, especially
since no major Western countries spoke out against the
military crackdown. China is reportedly supporting an
Algerian nuclear weapons development program by building a
nuclear reactor in that country. An unstable Algeria with
nuclear weapons is a great danger in the region.
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The fifth major factor is Iran. After Islamic
fundamentalists gained power in Iran in 1979, Iran became
thoroughly hostile to the West. Iran's aim is to export
government by Islamic law to its neighbors. This may create
a direct conflict with NATO since Iran's ambitions include
Turkey which is a NATO member and has a secular government.
Iran is now building a large military with the help of China
and North Korea and there are reports that Iran is buying
military equipment from Russia. CIA director Robert Gates
revealed the Iranian military buildup before the House Armed
Services Committee in March:
Iran's burgeoning, foreign-made arsenal includes advanced
warplanes, aircraft missiles and some extended- range Scud
missiles .... The country has also contracted to buy
at least two Russian submarines .... [We are] estimat-
ing that the total cost of foreign-made weapons acquired
by Iran between 1990 and 1994 will reach $10 billion.
That is a substantial sum for the country, particularly in
light of its struggle to repair damage done by the 1980-88
war with Iraq .... Iran is [also] trying to acquire a
nuclear weapons capability .... Another Iranian
weapons effort- -the development of poison gas warheads to
place atop Scud missiles- -is likely to succeed sooner.
The country's relatively crude chemical weapons program is
expected to produce such warheads within a few years. We
also suspect that Iran is working toward a biological
warfare capability. [Ref. 36 :p. A-l]
With Iraq economically and militarily devastated, Iran may try
to fill the power vacuum in the region by exerting significant
political and military pressure. Any Iranian move in the
region will create instability and will pose a threat to
NATO's Southern Flank.
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As is easily seen, peace in this region is very-
fragile and susceptible to many threats. Any crisis in the
region can directly affect NATO by disrupting the flow of oil
to the West and by creating instability in its Southern Flank.
Countries on NATO's Southern Flank could also be drawn into
war. Thus, even though no NATO member is located in the
Middle East, the threats in this region could effect NATO
politically, economically and militarily in a major way.
d. Nuclear proliferation
The almost unimaginable destructive power of
nuclear weapons places this threat in a class by itself. Five
nations have declared themselves to be nuclear powers, defined
as those countries that can deliver nuclear weapons to a
desired target. These are the U.S., the Commonwealth of
Independent States (the former Soviet Union, four of whose
republics have strategic nuclear weapons under unified
command) , China, France and Great Britain. The stated policy
of each is not to share nuclear weapons technology with other
countries who are not in the nuclear "club". Naturally,
allowing nuclear weapons to fall into the hand of a madman
harms everyone, especially these five major nuclear powers.
Accordingly, these countries have established the strictest
control on their weapons and weapons material as well as tight
controls over nuclear weapons -related technology. Disclosures
made in the last five years have shown that these controls are
inadequate and as a result it is becoming more and more likely
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that nuclear weapons will fall into irresponsible hands. This
represents the gravest threat to NATO, and it comes from
several directions.
The first is the former Soviet Union. The C.I.S.
has 27,000 nuclear weapons, 12,000 of which are long-range.
Although the current leaders of the C.I.S. have promised to
maintain the security of these weapons and dismantle whole
classes of them, weakened governments will probably not be
able to do this adequately. Given the devastated economies
and the sorry plight of military personnel who don't even have
enough to eat, a significant possibility exists that tactical
missiles, warheads, components or materials might be sold on
the black market to anyone willing to pay for them. [Ref . 37:
p. 33] Economic chaos has fostered a "sell-anything-you-can-
get- your -hands -on" mentality in the Soviet military and some
commanders may sell nuclear weapons as well. Another threat
is that unemployed Soviet atomic scientists and weapons
designers may sell their bomb-building skills to those foreign
countries eager to become nuclear powers. [Ref. 38 :p. 41]
Chairman of the U.S Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn
pointed out the significance of this threat:
We are on the verge of either having the greatest destruc-
tion of nuclear weapons in the history of the world or the
greatest proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear
materials and the scientific know-how to make these
weapons. [Ref. 38: p. 40]
Currently the C.I.S. 's nuclear weapons are under unified
command but the possibility exists that control may devolve
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into four or even more different authorities. This would make
it much more difficult for NATO to defuse a tense crisis or to
limit a nuclear exchange.
The second direction of this threat is from
China. Holding out in one of the last bastions of communism,
the government of China is committed to advancing this
ideology. Saddled with a backward and pathetic economy
largely brought on by this ideology, this government has sold
nuclear weapons technology to extremist states such as Iran
and North Korea in return for the hard currency it so desper-
ately needs. The Bush administration has attempted to exert
pressure on Beijing to stem the flow of nuclear technology by
establishing economic links between the U.S. and China but has
not had any real success to date.
The third direction of this threat is, ironical-
ly, from the West itself. Lax enforcement of technology
transfer prohibitions and the naked greed of private individu-
als and companies have allowed sophisticated technology,
machines and knowledge to flow into countries around the
world. It seems that Lenin, now universally discredited, was
right in one respect: a capitalist will sell you the rope to
hang him with.
The fourth direction is from several countries
around the world which are aggressively researching how to
make nuclear weapons. Encouraged and equipped with informa-
tion and material from China and West, many countries have
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embarked on massive programs to develop nuclear weapons. It
is generally known that Israel, India and Pakistan have
nuclear weapons. Many more countries are working to obtain
them, including Brazil, Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Algeria.
Of these, Iran, Iraq and Algeria are of the greatest concern
to NATO.
Of these three, Iran would be perhaps the
greatest danger to NATO if it obtained nuclear weapons
.
Facing stalemate in the 8 -year war with Iraq, in 1987 Ayatol-
lah Khomeini personally authorized a full-scale renewal of a
nuclear-bomb program that the Shah had begun. The program is
still continuing and the government of Iran is not hiding its
intentions. In a conference in Teheran, Iranian Vice Presi-
dent stated, "Since Israel continues to possess nuclear
weapons, we, the Muslims, must cooperate to produce an atom
bomb, regardless of U.N. attempts to prevent proliferation."
[Ref. 39 :p. 47] Iran is receiving help from China and some
analysts say Iran could have the bomb by year 2000.
Almost as dangerous is Iraq. U.N. inspectors
found a gigantic nuclear weapons program in Iraq and even now
do not know the extent of the program. Much material may
still be safely hidden, preserving Baghdad's may bomb-building
ability. Likewise, Algeria has built a reactor capable of
producing nuclear weapons and U.S. intelligence has also
reported rumors that Iraq provided Algeria with critical
nuclear technology. If this cooperation continues there is a
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distinct possibility that any weapons they develop might be
sold to other countries as well. [Ref. 39 :p. 48] It should
also be mentioned that there are reports that North Korea has
built an underground nuclear weapons research and production
facility. North Korea now produces missiles that can carry
nuclear warheads, not just for its own use but also for
export. [Ref. 39: p. 47] North Korean nuclear missiles may soon
find their way to the Middle East, where along with weapons
produced by Iran, Iraq and Syria or obtained from the C.I.S
could present a direct threat to NATO. Figure 3 illustrates
the nuclear proliferation.
D. THE INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT IN 1992 (STEP 4)
1. Strengths
NATO's most valuable asset is its unity which stood
the test of time and won the Cold War. Working side by side,
sixteen like-minded nations stopped Soviet expansion and
joined their resources to narrow the military gap with the
Soviet bloc. In this, the multi- committee structure of NATO
and the exemplary cooperation which grew up in these commit-
tees have proven to be very effective in making and implement-
ing strategies. Indeed, this has grown into one of NATO's key
strengths. These sixteen countries built a strong economic
base by implementing efficient economic policies and by
cooperating in the Organization Economic Cooperation Develop-
ment (OECD) and the European Economic Community (EEC) . They
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SCRAMBLE FOR THE BOMB
Figure 3: Nuclear Proliferation
Source: Time, 16 December 1991, p. 47
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exploited their advantage in technology and counterbalanced
the massive Soviet advantage in military forces. Indeed, the
well -planned and well -coordinated use of high technology
production brought an end to the Cold War as the Soviet effort
to keep up finally broke their economic back.
This unity did not come easily, however. It was a
lesson that took Europe centuries to learn. During the period
1871-1939, a great wave of hyper-nationalism engulfed Europe.
Each state was firmly convinced its own rights were absolute
and other's rights were not. Unfortunately, war rather than
negotiation was the rule; it took one war after another for
the folly of this attitude to sink in. World War I was caused
in part by the domination of civilian discussion by military
propaganda which primed the world for war. In contrast, the
stability of the post World War II period in Europe has been
partly due to the remarkable decline of nationalist propagan-
da. In fact, professional military officers are now nearly as
cautious as or even more reluctant than civilians in recom-
mending war. [Ref . 40:pp. 18-28] These two developments, the
decrease in ethnic rivalries between Western European states
and the reserve now displayed by military and civilian
leaders, led to the formation of pluralist democracies in
Europe. Germany, which caused two World Wars, has become
fully democratic and, somewhat surprisingly, is a fervent
supporter of a United Europe. The democracies of Europe have
learned that it is more profitable to cooperate economically
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and militarily than to try to dominate each other, and this
cooperation has paid off. The European economies are formida-
ble now and, when united, will be even more so. Once fierce
ideological opponents, all of the former East bloc countries
are begging for Western economic and technical help to salvage
their economies, destroyed by five decades of communist
oppression. These countries look to the West not only for
economic and technical help but also for political advice in
improving and democratizing their political institutions. As
a result of its unity, NATO now finds itself in a position of
economic, ideological, and political strength.
Besides these, NATO now enjoys great military
strength and a tremendous military advantage over its former
worst enemy- -the former Soviet Union and its forces positioned
on NATO's Central Front. Currently, NATO has 38 divisions,
8050 tanks, 4400 artillery/mortar pieces, 1345 fight-
er/bombers, 500 interceptor planes and 145 reconnaissance
planes deployed on the Central Front. Its weapons are modern
and effective. The quality of NATO tanks is the best in the
world. The M1A1 of the U.S., the Challenger of Great Britain
and the Leopard II of Germany are unequaled throughout the
world. NATO forces have excellent antitank weapons such as
the Milan, Tow, Dragon and SS-11 missiles, each of which have
more destructive power than any of the Russian-made antitank
weapons. NATO forces have antitank helicopters, fast and
effective infantry fighting vehicles and capable air defense
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systems. To increase technical superiority NATO members are
forming consortiums to share technology and produce newer
sophisticated weapons more efficiently. Against all this is
pitted the ragged remnants of the Soviet Red Army, equipped
with weapons proved to be inferior during the Gulf War.
Morale is at an all-time low and the logistics system and
infrastructure which supported the once -massive Soviet
military machine have crumbled. In contrast, one of NATO's
greatest military strengths lies in its excellent infrastruc-
ture. This includes the following [Ref. 41:pp. 54-55]:
Airfields : 230 NATO airfields have been constructed
with a full range of operation facilities, including airfield
pavements, jet fuel installations, ammunition storage and
hardened shelters.
Command, Control. Communication and Information
systems (C3 I) : NATO's C3I uses 50,000 km of landlines, radio
links and submarine cables. There is an integrated communica-
tion system in place which enables political authorities and
various military headquarters to be kept informed of develop-
ments in a crisis or war. NATO also has a satellite communi-
cation system which is interfaced to a sophisticated and
extensive multi-path voice and data network.
Petroleum facilities : There is a regional network of
NATO pipelines and associated transfer and storage facilities.
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This includes 3 million cubic meters of storage capacity and
11,000 km of pipelines.
Air defense systems : A chain of radar sites and
associated command and control centers is in place. NATO's
radar network provides sea and high/low air coverage from
Northern Norway to Eastern Turkey. Land and sea -based
airborne warning radars are part of this system as well.
Miscellaneous : There are also 80 naval bases and
many storage facilities, training facilities, headquarters
complexes, surface to air missile sites, surface to surface
missile sites, ammunition storage sites and forward storage
sites.
2 . Weaknesses
NATO's major weakness lies in its Southern Flank.
The countries that make up this Southern Flank are Spain,
France, Italy, Greece and Turkey. To begin, two of these are
not part of NATO's integrated military structure. France left
this structure in 1966, and when Spain joined NATO in 19 82 it
kept itself out of the integrated military structure. The
exclusion of these two creates a gap in the defense of the
region. The amount of territory under NATO's Southern Command
is huge and there are many geographic barriers, all of which
makes it difficult to coordinate between the three land
theaters (Italy, Greek and Turkish Thrace and Eastern Turkey)
and the autonomous maritime sub- theater (the Mediterranean
Sea) . Southern region nations are separated from each other
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by the Tyrrhenian, Adriatic and Aegean seas; maintaining lines
of communication effectively is hindered by rugged terrain,
and in certain areas, by inadequate infrastructure. In a
crisis, these problems could slow or even prevent the rein-
forcement of forces defending Eastern Turkey. As an example
of the vast expanses under NATO control, NATO's Commander of
Allied Air Forces, Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH) headquartered
in Naples, is tasked with coordinating the defense of NATO
airspace along a 3600 km border stretching from the Italian
Alps to eastern Turkey. What makes this even more important
is that this Southern Flank directly faces the multiple
threats from the Middle East. Geographic and other factors
related to these threats require that forces in the Southern
Flank be maintained at a higher state of readiness than in
other areas of NATO and that they be equipped with modern
weapons. Unfortunately, the Greek and Turkish militaries have
relatively poor equipment and are not sufficiently outfitted
or trained to function in an environment of nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons. They have taken measures, however, to
improve their armaments. Turkey established the Defense
Industry Development and Support Administration to create an
indigenous defense manufacturing capability and Greece
similarly established the Hellenic Vehicle and Arms Indus-
tries. These efforts have been hindered in some degree by the
serious economic problems of both. In Greece inflation has
exceeded 20 percent and the budget deficit has risen to $13
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billion. Turkey is confronted with hyperinflation and has
serious internal security problems in its southern provinces
which are diverting resources from NATO commitments. [Ref.
41:pp. 86-90]
The continuing Greek- Turkish dispute which erupted
into an armed conflict in Cyprus in 1974 continues to damage
the Alliance's operational effectiveness in the eastern
Mediterranean. The major problem between the two countries
remains the situation in Cyprus. However, there are also
disputes over territorial waters, airspace and continental
shelf resources around the Aegean Islands.
A second weakness of the Alliance lies in the defense
budget cuts in the member countries. If budget cuts continue,
the research and development of advanced weapons may cease.
With other countries such as China and North Korea eagerly
developing, manufacturing and exporting modern weapons, a
slowdown in NATO countries' weapons development lessens NATO's
technological advantages.
E. SUMMARY
Significant positive changes in the former Soviet Union
and in Eastern Europe have created incredible opportunities
for NATO. NATO's worst scenario, the ominous threat of
surprise attack by a 100 -division force, has vanished. All of
the Eastern European nations as well as the former Soviet
Union itself need Western help and they must stay on good
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behavior to get it. However, other threats are arising in
Central Europe in different form. Most of these threats stem
from political and economic uncertainties in those countries
of the region struggling to give birth to democracy. For the
moment, NATO's primary military threat has shifted to its
Southern Flank. New and growing threats from countries such
as Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya, which were not considered as
important in the past, should now be considered seriously.
The gravest threat to NATO appears to be from politically
unstable countries which are close to acquiring weapons of
mass destruction. This threat is so potentially destabilizing
and uncertainties throughout NATO's external environment are
so great that NATO must make strategic plans so it can cope
with future changes in these areas.
While this chapter has been devoted to analyzing present
threats and threats in the near future, the next chapter is
devoted to taking a good look farther into the future. As
stated in Chapter II, scenario building using verbal descrip-
tions is a tool particularly well suited to plan strategically
for these uncertainties and instabilities. Accordingly, the
scenarios in Chapter V will complete the analysis of the
internal and external environments of NATO, steps 3 and 4 of




In the last chapter we looked at the potential threats
and tremendous opportunities facing NATO today. One more step
is required before strategic plans can be formulated- the con-
struction of possible scenarios. These qualitative forecast-
ing techniques described in Chapter II, are used here to help
in developing a strategy for NATO for the next several
decades. As possible future events are considered, plans can
be developed to prevent or to meet them should they occur.
B. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
As explained in the last chapter, instabilities in the
former Soviet Union will -have far-reaching effects on NATO.
In this section, more background information is presented,
followed by descriptions of several likely scenarios and their
potential effects on NATO. The first two scenarios envision
a resurgent Russia and the second two see a Russia which has
dissolved in civil war.
1. Background of scenarios in the former Soviet Union
Today the former Soviet Union faces staggering
economic and social problems. As a result of Yeltsin's
economic policies prices are soaring in Russia. A kilo of
beef costs half a month's pension in Moscow. Agricultural and
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industrial production has been declining steadily. Economists
predict another 30 percent decline in GNP in 1992. Privatiza-
tion plans are still only crudely formulated and due to
resistance in the Russian Parliament, agricultural reforms can
not begin in 1992. There are severe shortages of consumer
goods and no provisions have been made to ensure adequate
supplies of these goods. Unemployment is also on the rise.
Economists predict that 11 million more people will become
unemployed in 1992. With no financial support, these unem-
ployed people fill the streets. Accordingly, the crime rate
is also increasing just as quickly. Proper health care is not
available in the hospitals either. During these difficult
times the Russian people are expecting Yeltsin and his
administration to do something to ease these critical prob-
lems, but so far there has been no significant improvement.
These economic and social problems have created an
intense pressure on the democratic reforms that have accompa-
nied recent economic initiatives. These pressures are
furthermore personified by right-wing nationalists, who are
taking advantage of the situation. As an example, national-
ists like Vlademir Zhirinovsky claim that Russia need more
authoritarian government to deal with these problems . As the
economic troubles continue he and other hard-liners are
gaining more and more public support. The key support that
they lack is that of the military. To day Yeltsin retains the
support of key commanders in the Soviet military, the same
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ones whose refusal to obey the August 1991 coup leaders
resulted in the coup's failure. These military leaders
believe in Yeltsin and in the democratic and free market
reforms he has promised to carry out. As the economic chaos
continues and the Russian military and even the Russia itself,
continues to disintegrate, the military hard-liners may at
last side with the right-wing nationalist and assume power.
Understandably, this would probably be accepted by the Russian
people who are weary of hardships and may view authoritarian-
ism as the only choice left, in the light of the failure of
Yeltsin's economic and political reforms.
Another consideration which provides necessary
background is the history of Russian domination of Europe and
Asia. Since the time of Peter the Great, Russia has exerted
military and political pressure on all of its neighbors.
Incredible but true, Russia has started more wars in Europe
than any other European state. Most recently the center of
brutal communist empire, Russia has never been ruled by
democratic governments. This is what makes democracy's
foothold in Russia so tenuous. President Boris Yeltsin, the
first popularly elected leader of Russia ever, has been placed
in the unenviable position of being expected to solve all of
Russia's serious problems. He is the symbol of democracy in
Russia, but his fate, as well as the fate of the democratic
and free market reforms he has championed, must improve
economic and social conditions to survive.
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2 . The Scenarios
In light of these background considerations, a
rightwing nationalist regime dominated by irresponsible
leaders is a distinct possibility. In this first scenario,
these leaders consolidate military and political control in
Russia and then begin to bully other former Soviet republics
and to work toward reentering Eastern Europe. Their main aim
is to regain the empire that so recently crumbled. This time,
however, it is under nationalist Russian flag instead of the
hammer and sickle. Of course, a polyglot empire such as those
ruled by the Soviets or the czars can be reconstituted only by
military force and by a return to the state of hostility
toward the outside world that existed for centuries [Ref.
42:p. 34]. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
expressed this Russian sentiment after he visited Moscow:
They [a group of Russians] argued that the United
States was taking advantage of the current situation and
that the term 'new world order' was highly presumptuous
because it assumed that Russia would no longer be a
significant factor in world affairs.
Above all, Russian nationalism translates into a
desire to restore traditional dominance over the other
republics. A major personality in Russian parliament told
me [Dr Kissinger] , 'we would never have put forward the
commonwealth if we had thought it possible that Ukraine
might actually become independent. I will never accept
Kiev as a foreign city.' [Ref. 42 :p. 35]
Accordingly, the first thing these nationalists will do is to
dominate Ukraine again. As Dr Kissinger observed, Russia has
never really accepted an independent Ukraine. Further, there
are other major problems between Russia and Ukraine. These
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are the control of nuclear weapons deployed on the Ukrainian
soil, the ownership of the Black Sea Fleet and who will
exercise command and control over conventional weapons. In
this scenario, the rightwing dictatorship in Moscow uses these
problems as a pretext and militarily overwhelms Ukraine.
Ukraine attempts to defend its territory but badly outnumbered
and cannot stop the Russian advance. 500,000 troops stationed
in Ukraine who are loyal to Moscow, equipped with modern
weapons, help the other Russian divisions. After dominating
Ukraine, Russia simultaneously attacks Poland, the Baltic
Republics and Kazakhstan. There are three different purposes
in these attacks. Russia attacks Poland to show the West that
it is still a power in Europe. The Russian attack on Baltic
Republics serves to demonstrate Russian resolve to revive the
old Soviet empire under a new Russian nationalism. Since the
baltics were the first to defy the old Soviet Union, they will
be the first to be subjugated again. The third attack is a
message to the Muslim states. Kazakhstan is the Muslim
central Asian Republic which has the most powerful resources
among the central Asian republics, and so Russian control of
Kazakhstan will bring the rest of the central Asian republics
under Russian domination. Russia uses the rights of the
Russian minorities living in these countries as a pretext for
these attacks. The Russian components of these populations is
substantial; 34 percent of Latvia, 9.5 percent of Estonia, 9
percent of Lithuania and 3 8 percent of Kazakhstan are Russian.
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Additional pretexts for invading Poland may be the humiliating
situation of the remaining former Soviet forces in Poland or
even supposed Polish nationalist attempts to regain the
territory that lost to the Soviet Union after World War II.
Russia demands that its troops be allowed to stay in Poland
and forces the Polish government to sign an agreement favored
by Russia. A major factor in all these is Russia's nuclear
intimidation.
The second scenario envisions a Russia which over-
comes its economic hardships. Russia with the help of the
West restores its economy. Increasing industrial production
and integrating its economy with the rest of the world's
economies. As a result of rapid economic growth, Russia
regains its strength, as Gorbachev had envisioned in the mid-
1980s. This resurgent Russia then chooses not to break from
the western camp and again becomes a superpower. This Russia
is ruled by a highly centralized government which is neither
completely democratic nor completely totalitarian. At the
same time the Eastern European countries and the other former
Soviet republics cannot recover fully from economic disaster.
Russia does not carry out a policy of military aggression
but instead dominates its former republics and satellites
economically. By providing economic aid to these countries,
Russia pulls them back into its orbit. Following this, Russia
also forms a military alliance with them and reaches agree-
ments which allow Russia to deploy forces to Eastern European
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countries to protect them from a powerful Germany. In this
way, Russia prevents the western powers from interfering with
Eastern European affairs and indicates clearly that its ready
to use military action to enforce this. Russia also ignores
its treaty obligations with the West and begins arming itself
again with sophisticated nuclear and conventional weapons.
This scenario is essentially the revival of the old Soviet
Union and the Warsaw Pact, but under a different ideology.
The third scenario, envisions civil war in the
Russian Federation itself. The former Soviet Union's mixed
ethnic composition was well known, but some do not realize how
fragmented is the ethnic composition of the Russian Federa-
tion. The population of 150 million people is composed of at
least 39 nationalities and scores of distinguishable ethnic
groups within these nationalities. Predominantly Muslim and
oil reach Chechen- Ingush and Tatar republics are restless.
Chechen- Ingush declared independence in November 1991 and
Tatar held a referendum in March 1992 in which the sovereignty
and equal status with Russia was approved. In this scenario,
other Russian Federation provinces attempt to do the same
thing. As the Russian government opposes this, armed clashes
break out. This results in a Yugoslavia- like civil war in the
Russian Federation, except in this case the secessionists
control tactical nuclear weapons and use them against Russia
when the uprising is close to defeat. This scenario could
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result in the complete disintegration of the Russian Federa-
tion.
A fourth and final scenario involves armed conflict
between the republics of the former Soviet Union. In this
case, Russia forms its own armed forces and the other
republics do the same. An armed conflict between Azerbaijan
and Armenia again breaks out, but this time the Central Asian
republics form an alliance and denounce Armenia. They give
Armenia an ultimatum to recognize the status quo in the
disputed Nogorno-Karabag enclave. Armenia refuses the demands
and as a result the Central Asian republics invade and
overwhelm Armenia. The Russian government intervenes in order
to show that it is still the leader in the region and has the
power to restore order. The Russian intervention, however,
creates a major armed conflict in the region in which tactical
nuclear weapons and chemical weapons are used, again resulting
in the disintegration of the governments of the republics.
3 . Effects of these four scenarios on NATO
All of these events have profound impacts on NATO.
The first two scenarios, which envision a resurgent Russia, is
critically important to NATO's planning, since an adventurous,
hard-liner Russian government means that NATO may have about
reducing its defenses may have to be shelved. In scenario
one, the threat is most imminent. A Russian reentry into
Poland immediately resumes the old confrontation of two forces
again, but this time on the Polish-German border (Oder-Neisse)
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instead of East -West German border. During the initial days
of the crisis Ukraine and later the Baltic Republics and
Poland ask for help from the West and specifically from NATO.
At this point the West applies economic sanctions to stop
Russian aggression, but the Russian government threatens to
use nuclear weapons. This time, with an adventurous govern-
ment in Russia controlling the nuclear weapons, the West
cannot predict as confidently where their adversary's nuclear
threshold will be. As Figure 4 shows, all of the NATO
countries are within range of SS-20 missiles based east of the
Urals.
Figure 4: Coverage of SS-20 missiles. Source: Ref . 14:p.ll3
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With such a great danger so close, the West hesitates and
Russia sees this as weakness and my continue its aggression
even further west. Even though Russian forces are poor in
quality, they still control the largest arsenal of convention-
al weapons in Europe.
In Scenario three, main danger lies in the control of
the nuclear weapons by secessionist groups in the Russian
Federation. Aside from the all-too-real possibility of
nuclear blackmail to obtain the West's support, there is a
significant degree of danger to the environment even from the
explosion of a small nuclear weapon in Russia. All of the
countries in Western Europe, especially Turkey, experienced
harmful fallout from the Chernobyl nuclear reactor incident.
An incident more severe than this could have grave effects on
the agricultural economies in the area.
In scenario four, there is another dimension to civil
war besides a nuclear exchange. A conflict in Central Asia
threatens the borders of NATO because Turkey is very close to
this region. Because of the historic, cultural, ethnic ties
between Turkey and the Central Asian republics, this conflict
may spill as Turkey feels forced to intervene on behalf of the
other Turkic states. Turkey may face another refugee crisis,
this time on her northeastern border, as the people of the
Central Asian republics flee from the devastation of war to
seek refuge in Turkey.
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C. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE
The scenarios described here for Eastern Europe are
similar to those described above for the former Soviet Union.
This similarity is to be expected, since for the last fifty
years the two have traveled down the same road together as
members of the Soviet empire. Likewise, in embracing democra-
cy and market -oriented reforms, their paths have also been
much the same. For these reasons, their shared backgrounds
and their similar visions of the future, the pitfalls they
face are alike as well. In the scenarios that follow the
pitfalls facing the Eastern European countries and the
implications of each are examined.
1. Scenarios
The first scenario related to the future of Eastern
Europe, is the domination of these countries by right-wing
military dictators. Economic hardships in these countries are
so severe that many people have lost hope in the democratic
process and in free market economy to bring about prosperity
or even some measure of relief. At the same time many
military leaders are becoming convinced that the best way, or
even the only way, to solve these problems, is to form an
authoritarian government. In this scenario, military and
civilian hard-liners from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and
Romania make contacts with their Russian counterparts and
decide to assume power. After assuming power in their
respective countries they sign an agreement to form an
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alliance between them. Russian forces are soon deploying to
Eastern Europe again. They blame the West for not giving
necessary help to rebuild their economies. Tension with West
grows rapidly as these leaders use nuclear blackmail or apply
other military pressure on NATO's borders to convince the West
to increase aid. This scenario is similar to scenario one in
the last section, except that in this case authoritarian
governments in Eastern Europe willingly cooperate with Russia
and invite Russian forces to their countries to "help" them
enforce their rules. In the above scenario, we assumed that
a revitalized Russia exists, one which is nationalistic and
which believes that the leadership of Eastern Europe belongs
to her. The following two scenarios use this same starting
point
.
Scenario two involves the dispute between Romania and
Hungary, described in chapter IV. This dispute centers around
the situation of ethnic Hungarians in Romania. Prompted by
the government of Hungary, the Hungarian minority in Romania
claims more and more rights, but the Romanian government
refuses their demands. Finally a breaking point is reached
and the Hungarian minority rises up against the Romanian
government, receiving help including military supplies from
Hungary. Romania vigorously protests the role of Hungary in
this conflict and accuses her of interfering in its internal
affairs. Diplomatic initiatives are put forward by both
countries but prove to be unsuccessful. Border clashes
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escalate and Hungary and Romania are drawn into an armed
conflict. Moldova, once part of Romania but lost to the
Soviet Union in 1940, uses the conflict between Romania and
Hungary as a pretext to reunite with Romania and help in the
war against Hungary. Ironically, minorities within Moldova,
the 14 percent who are Ukrainian and the 13 percent who are
Russian, contribute to Moldova's downfall by opposing and
requesting -and receiving- assurances of help from the Russian
government. Insistent, Moldova again declares itself a part
of Romania and joins the war against Hungary. Russia, Ukraine
and Belarus warn Moldova to repeal the unification and respect
the rights of the Russian and Ukrainian populations but
Moldova rejects their demands. Russia, Ukraine and Belarus
respond this time with military force. Other Eastern European
countries, fearing the involvement of these three Slavic
countries, especially Russia, in this conflict and anxious
that Russia will use this situation as a pretext to reenter
Eastern Europe with the help of Ukraine and Belarus, mobilize
their militaries and declare that if Russian forces cross the
Romanian border they too will get involved in the conflict.
This scenario ends in a major war in Eastern Europe in which
tactical nuclear weapons are used.
The third scenario in Eastern Europe has to do with
Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia is made up of Czechs and
Slovaks
. In the past there were disputes between these two
groups, but under communism these were suppressed. After the
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collapse of communism, however, for the first time in many
decades they have been allowed full and free expression. Now
Czechs and Slovaks have started preparing three constitutions:
one Czech, one Slovak and one federal constitution. This
effort is still in progress. This scenario projects that as
a result of deepening economic problems, the dispute between
Czechs and Slovaks flares up and efforts to mediate fail.
Slovaks demand to form their own state and secede from
Czechoslovakia. The federal government rejects their demand
and a civil war breaks out. Poland, Ukraine and Belarus,
which are also Slavic countries side with the Slovaks.
Hungary, which fears the rise of a Pan- Slavic sentiment, sides
with the Czechs. This situation brings about a major conflict
in Eastern Europe. Russia at first offers its help as a
mediator to find a peaceful solution to the problem. The
Czechs, however, ask for help from the West to restore the
situation. Russia militates against any Western involvement
by deploying troops to Poland to help the Slovaks, while the
nations of the west strongly protest the Russian action. Also
fearing a new Russian expansionism, Romania demands support
from the West and mobilizes its forces. An anti-Western
Russian administration curtly states this is a Slavic matter
and threatens the West with using military force, including
weapons of mass destruction, to stop further Western involve-
ment .
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The fourth and final scenario concerns the Balkan
peninsula which today contains the countries Yugoslavia,
Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece and part of Turkey. In
addition to disputes between any two of this, as one reviews
the history of this region and today observes the political
landscape one senses that any dispute could cause a chain
reaction involving all the countries in a major war. Before
first world war this peninsula was the political hot spot of
Europe, and the spark which started that war occurred in the
peninsula when Austrian Archduke Ferdinand was assassinated in
Sarajavo by a Serb. The Current situation in the region is
little better, as described in the previous chapter.
Macedonia proclaimed its independence from Yugoslavia in March
1992. In this scenario Macedonia gains recognition from the
West and gets economic aid. This resurgent Macedonia starts
claiming from Bulgaria territories which had once belonged to
Macedonia. Bulgaria strongly rejects this claim and announces
that it will use military action to prevent this. Tension
boils over and Macedonia and Bulgaria go to war. This
situation causes a chain reaction in the following sequence.
Romania attempts to incorporate Dobrudja, a territory adjacent
to the Black Sea and currently divided between Romania and
Bulgaria. Bulgaria resists and the Bulgarian people in
Dobrudja rise up against Romania. Romania, trying to use the
armed conflict between Macedonia and Bulgaria to its advan-
tage, uses force to annex the region. Bulgaria responds in
109
like manner, while at the same time resumes repressing the
Turkish minority in response to pressure from Bulgarian
nationalists. This situation creates a sharp dispute with
Turkey. Greece, which had refused to acknowledge that Macedo-
nia exists strongly protests the Macedonian action, which
stirs up further trouble on the Greece's northern border. At
the same time Albanians living in the Serbian province of
Kosova rise up and try to claim this province for Albania.
The government of Albania supports their efforts and clashes
between Albania and Serbia start. Croatia takes advantage of
this and resumes its attack against Serbia. All of these
events together explode into a major war in the Balkan
Peninsula.
2. Effects on NATO
All of these scenarios would affect NATO greatly,
because most of them share at least one border with a NATO
country. There will be two major effects.
The worst situation would be a menacing military
presence, especially Russian, in one of these adjacent
countries, as in scenarios one through three. Any reentry of
Russia into Eastern Europe resumes the old confrontation
between the NATO forces and Russian forces on the NATO's
eastern border. In all three scenarios Russia is hostile to
the West and threatens to use nuclear forces. Any use of
nuclear forces, even in Eastern Europe, would be an environ-
mental and economic disaster.
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Almost as bad as a nuclear threat, and potentially-
even more destabilizing, would be the huge refugee problems on
NATO's borders in the event of a war. Refugees and war go
together; NATO would have this situation thrust on it with no
choice. As the Albanian refugee exodus to Italy in 1991
showed, economic reasons alone create tremendous pressure on
the receiving country to return the refugees. If they cannot
be feasibly returned, their presence can destibilize the
government. Germany experienced the same problem when East
Germans overwhelmed West Germany just before reunification
occurred in October 1990. Both crises created troubles for
both countries and consumed vast resources. Both of these
cases were limited. Italy repatriated the Albanian refugees
and re-unification made the German problem manageable. In a
major war in Eastern Europe or especially in the Balkans, the
refugee problem will dwarf these two examples and could
completely overwhelm the abilities of NATO countries to absorb
or even temporarily keep the refugees. And the greatest
refugee burden may fall on. the NATO members least equipped to
deal with it: Turkey and Greece. In January 1991, a stream of
Albanian ethnic Greeks crossed the Greek border and, in
earlier June 1989, more than 3 00,000 ethnic Turks were
expelled to Turkey by the communist government of Bulgaria.
Refugees streaming across borders en masse will themselves
constitute a security problem for Turkey and Greece by
heightening ethnic and nationalist anger in both countries
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[Ref. 35:pp. 145-146]. Turkey and Greece will have an addi-
tional economic problem, since a large part of their economies
depends on trade with the other Balkan countries and a war
would certainly disrupt this
.
D. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The third geographic area relevant to NATO's security is
the Middle East. The efforts of Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya and
Algeria to acquire sophisticated conventional weapons and
weapons of mass destruction, as well as the unstable politics
of these countries, were explained in the previous chapter.
This section builds on that discussion by developing three
scenarios.
1. Scenarios
The first scenario envisions a radical and militarily
adventurous Iran flexing its muscles. Since 1980, when Iran
became an Islamic state, Islamic fundamentalists have con-
trolled Iran. In spite of Iranian President Hashemi
Rafsanjani's attempts to curb the influence of the mullahs and
to initiate market reforms, fundamentalists keep their power
and push Rafsanjani to take a more radical line. The funda-
mentalists see the weak position of Iraq and the turmoil in
the former Soviet Union as an opportunity to realize their aim
set for them by Ayatollah Humaini : to gather all the Muslims
under one Iranian- led banner. In this scenario they amass a
huge quantity of military hardware and decide it is time to
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act. They try to influence the former Soviet republics of
Central Asia by providing aid to them along with ideological
education. They help Azarbaijan in its war with Armenia by
sending troops. Iran's interference in Azarbaijan and its
shrill propaganda for Islamic fundamentalism threatens to
destroy relations between Iran and Turkey. Turkey, the only
NATO member with a majority Muslim population, is a secular
state and strongly opposes any kind of Islamic fundamentalism.
Iran, on the other hand, is doing all it can to cast itself as
the world leader of Islam. An example of this is its continu-
al attempt to keep the Palestinian issue on the world agenda.
So using the activities of sympathetic Shiite groups in Iraq
as a screen, Iran reopens its war with Iraq. Iraq, tries to
resist but cannot stop the fast Iranian troops supported by
long-range missiles based in Iran.
The United Nations Security Council immediately
issues a resolution condemning Iran's action and demands a
cease fire and withdrawal of all Iranian forces from Iraq;
this resolution is accompanied by economic sanctions. Iran
declares that it will not obey the resolution unless Israel
withdraws from the occupied Palestinian territories. By
framing the issues as a battle of the Islamic faithful against
the infidels, Iran increases anti-Western sentiment in the
region to gain as much public support as possible. China
allows the U.N. sanctions to pass but continues to provide
technical expertise and military hardware to Iran in exchange
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for hard currency. Iran eventually captures all Iraqi oil
fields, holds them hostage, knowing that West cannot afford to
loose this oil in the long term. After consolidating its
initial gains in Iraq, Iran begins to put pressure on Saudi
Arabia for its oil revenues. Saudi Arabia requests Western
help. Iran begins to attack Israel by using long-range
ballistic missiles, sometimes using chemical war heads.
Israel retaliates with chemical then with nuclear weapons.
The outrage of the other Muslim countries plunges the entire
Middle East into a general war, interrupting NATO's oil
supplies and threatening to involve Turkey at any moment.
The second scenario sees Iraq and Syria as major
antagonists working together against Israel. Syria's Hafez
Assad, one of the chief architects of Arab support for the
American coalition in the Gulf War, decides cooperation with
the West is no longer necessary for the moment. He makes a
broad alliance with a rehabilitated Iraqi government which has
ousted Saddam Hussein and appears more moderate. Promising
democratic reforms the new Iraqi leaders successfully bring an
end to sanctions and, along with Assad, tighten their control
and continue to arm again. Syrian and Iraqi leaders believe
that no solution can be found with Israel through negotiations
and they publicly blame the U.N. for using double standard
with Arab and Israeli issues. The Iraqi leadership makes a
momentous announcement that they will support Syria by all
means available should a war breaks out with Israel. Syrian
-
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backed terrorists intensify their attacks on Israel and Israel
retaliates accordingly. Tension between Israel and both Iraq
and Syria rises to a fever pitch. King Hussein of Jordan
tries to ease the situation but is toppled by Palestinian
extremists. Syria, Iraq and Jordan begin launching missiles
into Israel and provoking a massive Israeli retaliation on all
three countries. A general war follows, with chemical weapons
used by both sides. Threatened by NATO bases in Southern
Turkey and nursing a grievance from Turkey's assistance to the
allies in the Gulf War, Iraq attempts to strike these bases.
Syria joins in and claims the Hatay province of Turkey, which
by a 1939 referendum was incorporated into Turkey. Syria also
accuses Turkey of using water pipelines as a weapon. This
situation threatens Turkey's territorial integrity and draws
a measured response from Turkey against both Syria and Iraq.
These two countries also accuse Saudi Arabia and Kuwait of
conspiring with the West during the Gulf War, and attempt to
bring these countries' oil reserves under their control using
the threat of chemical or nuclear weapons. Attempting next to
blackmail the West with an oil embargo, Syria and Iraq draw
NATO into the war.
The third and the final Middle East scenario pits
Libya and Algeria against NATO. For the last twenty years
Libya has been an unceasing irritant to the West. Most
recently, Libya declined to turn over two intelligence
officers accused of bombing Pan Am Flight 103 in 1986. As a
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result the U.N. imposed limited sanctions on Libya. In this
scenario, Libya's continuing intransigence results in full
economic sanctions. After these are put into effect, Libya
faces an economic crisis. Libyan leader Kaddafi feels he must
do something to save face, or just to keep his power. At the
same time, Algerian Islamic fundamentalists exploit the
situation by stirring up sentiment against the West's inter-
ference in an Islamic nation. As inroads are reopened in the
Libyan army and in the Libyan people, Kaddafi gives full
support to the Islamic groups in Algeria. The Islamic groups
at last are able to assume power in Algeria and at once
promise to support Libya in its struggle with the West. What
makes this scenario different is that Algeria has acquired
nuclear weapons. Libya and Algeria begin to attack to the
Western interests. They disrupt NATO's lines of communication
in the Mediterranean with the threat of nuclear weapons and
whip up anti-Western sentiment in the other Arab countries of
the Middle East with a well -financed propaganda campaign and
an attack on Israel. As before, NATO is drawn into a general
war in the Middle East.
2. Effects on NATO
In all three scenarios one or more NATO countries are
directly attacked. According to the North Atlantic Treaty,
"an attack on one or more members is considered an attack on
them all." So NATO countries have to support their allies and
that will be the first test of NATO in combat. In the general
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wars described here, it is highly probable that one or more
NATO members will be hit by weapons of mass destruction,
resulting in political and economic chaos. The flow of Middle
East oil to NATO countries is disrupted, causing further
serious economic damage. To make things worse, the lines of
communication and transportation come under attack in the
Mediterranean, making it difficult to deploy troops and
supplies from one theater to another.
E. SUMMARY
In this chapter scenarios about the possible future
developments were constructed. It is also important to note
that infinite number of events can occur in the future. The
scenarios presented here are the probable ones when one takes
into consideration the history and the current events.
Scenarios presented here were related to former Soviet Union,
Eastern Europe and the Middle East, three regions in which the
developments have an immediate effect on NATO. Also NATO
planners should keep in mind the unpredictable emergence of
another power which may pose threat in the future. In light
of Chapter IV and Chapter V, the next chapter presents the new
strategic planning of NATO.
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VI. A NEW STRATEGY FOR NATO
A. INTRODUCTION
At this point the strategic planning process is about
half done. Steps 1 and 2, which briefly address NATO's
mandates and mission, and steps 3 and 4, which examine the
internal environment and external environments in the present
and in the future, have been examined. In this chapter the
process will be completed. The new strategic issues for NATO,
which are based on the preceding analyses of the environments,
are presented, thereby completing step 5. Next, NATO's
mandates and mission, steps 1 and 2, are reexamined in light
of steps 3 through 5. Finally, a new strategy for NATO is
formulated to complete step 6.
B. THE NEW STRATEGIC ISSUES
1. How can we prevent instabilities in the former
Soviet Union or in Eastern Europe from developing into major
conflicts that threaten the security and interests of our
people? How can we maintain stability throughout Europe?
2. How can we deter Russia (alone or with its former
allies) , hostile Middle Eastern countries or any other country
or group of countries from endangering the security and the
vital interests of our countries without assigning too many
resources to this task?
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3. Should deterrence fail, how can we defend the
territories and interests of our nations and defeat the
aggressor?
4. How can we keep countries with unstable politics and
those who are hostile to the West from obtaining weapons of
mass destruction? If they obtain them, how can we protect our
people from being attacked with them?
5. How can we verify that Russia and its former allies
are complying with the arms reduction treaties they have
signed? How can we verify that Russia is dismantling its
weapons of mass destruction as it promised and is preventing
the transfer of these weapons and related technologies to any
third party?
The instabilities and their possible developments along
with their effects to NATO were explained in the previous
chapters. NATO's mission generally states that: "... to
promote the stability and well-being of the Alliance area."
So, NATO should effectively deal with the potential crises and
should prevent them from developing into major conflicts. If
NATO fails to deal with them, then major conflicts may spill
over into NATO countries and pose the threats mentioned in the
previous chapters. That is the essence of the first strategic
issue.
Assessment of the external environment showed that a
threat may come from the former Soviet Union, alone or with
its former allies, and from the Middle East. Another country
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or group of countries may emerge in the future which pose a
threat to the security of the member countries . NATO should
deter all of them from attempting to attack NATO nations.
NATO should also defeat any kind of aggression, should it
occur, in order to protect its territory and well-being of its
people. In light of the new opportunities NATO should do it
without putting great burden on the constrained resources.
These are the essences of the second and the third strategic
issues. If NATO fails to address these issues then the old
confrontation may resume in Europe or a resurgent Russia may
again bully the West. In the Middle East, any country may
calculate that it is not so risky to act against the West, and
may threaten the territory and the vital interests of NATO.
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction puts NATO
countries in danger. If any country uses these weapons
against NATO, then the destruction in the member country which
is hit will be immense. The proliferation of these weapons
threatens the very security of NATO countries because of their
destructive power and their adverse effects on the environ-
ment. External environmental analysis showed that these
weapons may be controlled by some irresponsible people in
Russia and by some other countries that are also trying to
develop such weapons. That is the essences of the fourth and
part of the fifth issues. If NATO fails to deal with them it
faces the great danger of these kinds of weapons. Russia and
its former allies pledged to reduce their conventional
120
arsenals. But, the Western countries should be sure that they
are fulfilling these obligations. The reason of arms reduc-
tion is to improve the security environment in Europe by
eliminating the offensive capabilities of the armies so that
no country can bully another one. If NATO fails to ensure
this then an adventurous government in Russia or in an Eastern
European country may find an offensive army at its disposal,
powerful enough to threaten West again. That is the essence
of the fifth issue.
C. MANDATES REVISITED (A BRIEF RETURN TO STEP 1)
There are two points that should be addressed concerning
NATO's mandates. The first is that since the North Atlantic
Treaty did not mention the Soviet threat specifically (nor did
it mention any other specific threat) , no modification to the
Treaty is needed now that this once formidable threat has
wilted and others are sprouting in its place. Actions taken
in response to the mandate of defending NATO countries against
any threat are simply redirected toward these new ones. The
second point is that Article 6's strict prohibition against
military action outside NATO territories should be relaxed in
order to deal with newer, different kinds of threats. A brief
review of the history of this prohibition and the reasons for
changing it follow.
After helping to put an end to two World Wars in which
Europe was the center stage, the United States was stretched
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uncomfortably between two necessities. Her inevitable
involvement in these two wars despite great efforts to the
contrary revealed that she must take an active part in
maintaining peace in the world and especially in Europe.
Isolationism was dead and the conviction that aggressors must
be stopped in their tracks was held nearly unanimously. On
the other hand, the great cost of these two wars and the
seeming ease with which the countries of the world were drawn
into them compelled her to find a way to make getting involved
more difficult. This sentiment, shared by other countries in
Western Europe, found expression in Article 6 of the North
Atlantic Treaty. This article stated that the Alliance would
jointly defend only against attacks on members' own territo-
ries, adjacent seas and sovereign islands in the North
Atlantic Treaty's area. Predictably, Out -of -Area (00A)
challenges have been a source of friction in the Alliance ever
since the Treaty was signed in 1949. During the Cold War the
Soviet Union's actions in and through various third world
countries kept this issue alive within NATO. [Ref . 41: pp. 25-
26]
As the disintegration of the Soviet Union accelerated in
1989 and 1990 many NATO members were glad to put this issue to
rest, or so they thought. The invasion of Saddam Hussein's
forces into Kuwait awakened NATO with a jolt. This action and
the ensuing Gulf War in which Kuwait was eventually liberated
demonstrated that certain vital NATO interests worth defending
122
lay outside the boundaries drawn by Article 6. Allied
participation in the Gulf War was highly effective and serves
in some ways as a model for future Out -of -Area involvements.
[Ref. 41:pp. 25-26]
Even before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, voices within NATO
were recommending that the 00A limitations should be relaxed.
Ironically, the United States was one of this view's most
vocal proponents. At a 1991 conference in Washington, D.C.,
Stephen J. Hadley, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Interna-
tional Security Affairs, urged the allies to consider new
guidelines in this area:
I hope Europe could now break out of the sterile debate
over out -of -area deployments. It is, I think, in some
measure 'old -think'. The world has changed, and I think
the events in the Persian Gulf have really shown that the
out -of -area has come into the NATO area. As evidence the
Iraqi ground threat to Turkey- a NATO member- and the
possibility that Middle Eastern ballistic missiles might
one day target Western European cities. [Ref. 43: p. 452]
U.S. Senator William V. Roth Jr. (R-Del.) said during the
Senate's war debate that "NATO, if it is to be relevant in the
world of tomorrow, must play a more significant role where its
vital interests are at stake, as they are now in the Persian
Gulf." [Ref.43:p. 454]
In spite of these sentiments, however, Article 6 was
still in effect. But as the saying goes, "Where there's a
will, there's a way," and NATO's members decided to defend
their vital interests in the Persian Gulf. This time,
however, it was under the banner of the United Nations. Most
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interesting was the shift in attitudes throughout the NATO
countries.
America, Britain and France contributed the greatest part
of the accumulated ground, air and naval forces used in the
effort. Given their dependence on Middle East oil and their
history of involvement in regional conflicts in the context of
the U.N. Security Council, this was not surprising. But other
nations formerly reluctant to get involved in this type of
action willingly participated this time. Turkey deployed
120,000 troops and 48 fighter planes on the Iraqi border and
granted basing rights to U.S. aircraft. Germany, which had
objected to the transfer of U.S. tanks from Germany to Israel
during the 1973 Yom Kippur War as a violation of NATO's 00A
mandate, provided substantial assistance in moving the U.S.
Army's VII Corps from Germany to Saudi Arabia. Similarly
Spain, who with France had forbidden U.S. aircraft to cross
their airspaces to attack Libya in 1986, hosted 15 B-52
bombers that mounted regular raids on Iraq. France also
agreed to let B-52s based in southern Britain cross its
territory and even land to refuel. [Ref. 43 :p. 453] All
other members made similar contributions because the situation
in the gulf threatened NATO's Southern Flank and all of the
members need the vital resource of the region, oil.
The Out -of Area Gulf crisis had posed a serious challenge
to the Alliance, and the Western nations met the challenge and
passed the test with flying colors. All of the NATO countries
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now agree that the probability of a similar crisis occurring
again is high and so they are speaking out accordingly.
Though formal debate over Article 6 has not yet begun, cracks
in this article are appearing everywhere. Recently the
President and the two Vice Presidents of the North Atlantic
Assembly stated that "Changed global circumstances demand a
changed NATO charter in order to allow the Alliance to
confront, promptly and directly, threats to its members'
security from wherever those threats emanate." [Ref. 41:p. 26]
General John Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, said
plainly that "Out -of -area activities are going to be . . .
something that is definitely part of NATO's future."
[Ref .41:p. 26] U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and former
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher have also strongly
hinted at their dissatisfaction with the Treaty's constraints;
other members have similarly called for the broadening of
NATO's areas of responsibility. [Ref. 41 :p. 26] When the time
comes to change the Treaty, Article 12 describes the proce-
dure :
After the treaty has been in force for ten years, or at
any time thereafter, the parties shall, if any of them so
requests, consult together for purposes of reviewing the
Treaty, having regard for the factors that affect peace
and security in the North Atlantic Area .... [Ref .44 p.
15]
Article 6 should be revised in this way: ". . .in order that
NATO take on a broadened role, deterring conflict not only in
the member nations' territories but wherever else conflict may
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threaten the security of the Alliance members." [Ref. 41:p.
26] NATO's mandates, then, should be as follows:
1. NATO is, and will remain, a purely defensive Alli-
ance. NATO's doctrine will continue to be based on measured
and timely resistance to attack, from whatever source. NATO
will never initiate aggression. [Ref. 45 :p. 88]
2. NATO will deter and if necessary defeat an aggres-
sion wherever aggression threatens the security of member
nations as well as the territories of the member nations and
adjacent waters.
3. Military power will continue to contribute toward
stability and will remain an essential safety net for the
security of the allies. NATO will continue to maintain
military forces. [Ref. 45 :p. 88]
4. NATO will obey all the resolutions of the U.N.
Security Council.
D. MISSION REVISITED (A BRIEF RETURN TO STEP 2)
Like the mandates, NATO's mission should also be revised.
The first part is a stakeholder analysis. The stakeholders
are still the people in the countries of Western and Southern
Europe which signed the North Atlantic Treaty. This has not
changed. What has changed is how the stakeholders will
measure success. As before, NATO still must deter any attack
on these countries and, if deterrence fails, must successfully
defend against the attack. Also NATO still must ensure the
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peace and stability of its members. Now, however, NATO must
work politically and economically to ensure a stable Europe as
well so that military intervention there will not be neces-
sary. To the extent possible, NATO must also foster stability
in the former Soviet Union, North Africa and the Middle East.
And NATO must do all this on a reduced defense budget. After
forty- five years of Cold War and most recently a long reces-
sion, the people of the NATO countries want a "peace dividend"
and expect their governments to give it to them. Under these
pressures all member governments are being forced to reduce
military spending to a realistic figure and use their con-
strained resources in the other areas that need attention. The
following revised mission statement for NATO takes all this
into consideration:
The North Atlantic Treaty is the political framework for
an international Alliance designed to prevent aggression
or to repel it, should it occur. The organization exists
to safeguard the freedom, security and vital interests of
all its members by political and military means in
accordance with the principles of the United Nations
Charter.
The means by which the Alliance pursues its main security
purpose include the maintenance of a military capability
sufficient to prevent war and to provide for effective
defense; an overall capability to manage successfully
crises affecting the security and vital interests of its
members; and the pursuit of political efforts favoring
dialogue with other nations and the active search for a
cooperative approach to European security, including the
field of arms control and disarmament.
To fulfil the needs of its members, the Alliance performs
the following security tasks:
I. To provide one of the indispensable foundations for
a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth
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of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful
resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to
intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose
hegemony through the threat or use of force.
II. To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North
Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied
consultations on any issues that effect their vital inter-
ests, including possible developments posing risks for
members' security, and for appropriate coordination of their
efforts in fields of common concern.
III. To deter and defend against any threat or
aggression against territories and interests of the member
nations, including proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources.
IV. To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.
The nature of the Alliance embodies the transatlantic link
by which the security of North America is permanently tied
to the security of Europe.
The fundamental operating principle of the Alliance is
that of common commitment and mutual cooperation among
sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of
security for all of its members. An armed attack on one
or more of them shall be considered an attack against them
all and consequently, if such an armed attack occurs, all
parties will assist the party or the parties attacked
including the use of armed forces if necessary to restore
and maintain the security of the Alliance area.
There are also other institutions in Europe, however the
extend of NATO's membership and of its capabilities gives
it a particular position in that it can perform all four
core security functions mentioned above. [Note: this
mission statement is adapted from Ref . 46]
E. THE NEW STRATEGY FOR NATO
1 . Background
Today's strategic issues are quite different from
those of the yesterday's. In the past, as it was explained in
Chapter III, all the strategic issues were related to the
Soviet Union and its system of satellites. Yesterday's threat
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was also predictable, an immediate invasion from the Eastern
Bloc. So, all the strategies, including the force structures,
were developed to manage this main issue in the past. But,
today's issues are not centered on one main enemy, like Soviet
Union. Today's issues are versatile, threat to the Alliance
can come from different sources in different forms. What is
worse, the environment is very uncertain today. On the other
hand, West has a great opportunity today, reduced tension
brings about reduced military spending. Instead of building
armies, countries can spend their money for the well-being of
their peoples. NATO has to take this opportunity. NATO has
to take another opportunity which is the achieving Alliance
objectives through political means. These two opportunities
have already been incorporated into NATO's mission statement.
There are several alternatives for NATO. The first
alternative is that: NATO reduces its forces to a reasonable
level while deploying them on its eastern border as before for
deterrence. NATO also relies heavily on its nuclear weapons
to deter potential threats from weapons of mass destruction
against its members. For this purpose NATO initiates a
nuclear modernization program. Another alternative is the
reduction of NATO's forces to a minimum level while improving
dialogue and cooperation with the former Soviet republics and
the Eastern European countries. NATO's minimum forces' main
mission is the peacekeeping duties. NATO also takes measures
for arms reduction treaty verifications and nuclear prolifera-
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tion and forms a defense against weapons of mass destruction.
The third alternative is similar to the second one. Only-
difference is that NATO maintains its forces at today's level
in this alternative. The fourth and the last one is a hybrid
of all of them. In this alternative NATO reduces its forces
to a reasonable level, this forces become more flexible to
deploy crises areas quickly and more versatile to perform
different duties. NATO also improves cooperation and dialogue
with the former Soviet republics for crisis prevention and
crisis management purposes, takes measures for arms reduction
treaty verifications and nuclear proliferation and forms a
defense against weapons of mass destruction.
The first alternative uses one opportunity but misses
the other. It envisions force reductions but does not deal
with crisis prevention and crisis management through dialogue.
NATO's mission statement states that one of the objectives of
NATO is to create stability in Europe by improving dialogue
and cooperation with the other countries. This alternative
cannot achieve this objective. Also deploying NATO's forces
on its eastern border is a passive approach to the security.
Since, in this alternative NATO does not get involved in
cooperation and dialogue with the other countries of Europe it
may require more effort to contain a conflict if it reaches
NATO's borders. It is also a passive approach to rely on
nuclear weapons for deterrence against the use of weapons of
mass destruction by other countries. That means NATO will
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wait for being hit before it uses its nuclear weapons. That
may be too late.
The second alternative exploits both opportunities
but the minimum force level is not consistent with NATO's two
main security tasks: preserve the strategic balance in Europe
and defense and deter against an aggression. That force level
is not enough to perform these tasks. Otherwise the alterna-
tive deals with other strategic issues. Likewise, the third
alternative misses one of the opportunities: reduction of
forces and delivering the resources to the other areas. This
alternative also conflicts with the main issue that the
stakeholders want: reduction in military spending. The fourth
alternative exploits all opportunities, satisfy the key
stakeholders through force reductions without endangering the
deterrence and defensive posture and through improving the
stability in Europe by way of cooperation and dialogue and
provides response to each strategic issue. So the strategy
statements should use its main ideas . Strategy statements
are as follow:
2. Responding to the Issues (Strategy Statements)
a. Maintaining stability in Europe (Issue 1)
As we have seen, NATO's primary aim is to ensure
the security of its members without needing to go to war.
Consequently, NATO's security is necessarily linked to the
stability of the countries surrounding the Alliance. For this
reason, diplomatic and political efforts to promote stability
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in these countries are extremely important. Particularly by
encouraging dialogue and peaceful mediation of conflicts, NATO
can contribute significantly to its own peace and stability as
well as benefit its neighbors. [Ref. 45: p. 90] Also, if any
conflict occurs in former Soviet Union or in Eastern Europe in
spite of these efforts, NATO will first, rely heavily on
political means to contain the conflict before taking any
military action. All of these require that NATO should
improve dialogue and cooperation among the parties involved.
If required, NATO should send military forces which are purely
defensive and multinational to the troubled areas in order to
perform peacekeeping duties. This broad policy statement is
a response to the first issue which requires the prevention of
crisis in the troubled areas before developing further and
reaching the territories of NATO and promoting stability in
Europe
.
b. Deterring and defending against attack (Issues 2
& 3)
To protect peace and to prevent war, any kind of
coercion and the vital interests of its people, the Alliance
should maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional
forces based in the Alliance's territory. These forces should
be at a significantly reduced level because of the reduced
immediate threat, but they must not be reduced too far.
Conventional forces help prevent war by ensuring that no
potential aggressor can achieve a quick victory, or territori-
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al gain, by conventional means. Considering the many kinds of
threats and the uncertainties associated with them, the
Alliance must maintain the forces necessary to provide a wide
range of conventional response options. [Ref. 46 :p. 10] NATO
should form the appropriate forces and build the necessary
infrastructure for this purpose. If necessary, these forces
should be deployed out -of -area to protect the interests and
security of the member nations. NATO should concentrate its
forces and transfer the reinforcements, if necessary, to the
areas under threat at the proper time. However, the
Alliance's conventional forces alone cannot ensure peace is
preserved. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution to the
deterrence by rendering the risk of any aggression incalcu-
lable and unacceptable. [Ref. 46 :p. 10] Nuclear weapons must
be maintained as a deterrent force but at the same time must
be the weapons of last resort. Future forces should be
multinational, wherever possible, because of force reductions
in member countries. As individual nations commit smaller
forces to Europe's defense, today's single-nation formations
will be replaced by smaller, less effective and less surviv-
able units. Creating multinational formations is a reasonable
solution. This approach permits national force draw downs
without causing substantial reductions in effectiveness. [Ref.
47 :p. 3 0] This broad statement is a response to the second
and the third issues. How can we deter and defeat the enemy?
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c. Preventing nuclear proliferation and protecting
against nuclear attack (Issues 4 & 5)
NATO members should cooperate in order to prevent
the transfer of nuclear knowledge and equipment to other coun-
tries. NATO should assist and monitor the dismantling of the
Soviet nuclear weapons. Members of the Alliance should
cooperate to form a defense against the weapons of mass
destruction. Members should also take special measures to
verify the agreed upon arms reductions. This statement is a
response to the last two issues.
3. The Strategy: Crisis Response and Reduced Forward
Presence
a. Overview
NATO's new strategy can be called as "crisis re-
sponse" with "reduced forward presence." [Ref. 48 :p. 3]
Crisis response requires first to eliminate the causes of the
crises by confidence building measures, if a crisis occurs in
spite of this, settle it with political means before it
reaches a high level, and if the use of force is necessary
then these forces should be deployed to the area promptly.
Today, the range of contingencies are broader than during the
Cold War period, at the same time crises could occur more
frequently and they could be less predictable. It is also not
feasible to plan against one or two major contingencies, in
the way that was possible during the Cold War. Rather, it is
necessary to develop certain kinds of capabilities in order to
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make the tasks of crisis management and crisis response easier
in a variety of situations. [Ref . 49 :p. 511] Reduced forward
presence allows the member nations to reduce their military
forces. Since the Soviet troops have withdrawn from Eastern
Europe, there is no forward line in the central front.
Details of the NATO's new strategy are presented below.
b. Crisis response: political measures
The first element of the strategy is dialogue and
cooperation with the former Soviet Union (CIS) and the Eastern
European countries in order to prevent a crisis. First thing
to do is to improve the dialogue and communication between the
CIS (including all of its members) and the Eastern European
countries and NATO. As the environmental analyses showed,
instability, domestic turmoil, ethnic conflicts, and tradi-
tional rivalries are the major threats as opposed to the
premeditated aggression by any of the major powers. To prevent
them from happening mechanisms that facilitate dialogue and
minimize the prospects for misperseption or miscalculation
should be developed, these mechanisms are very important
aspects of both crisis prevention and crisis management [Ref.
49 :p. 514] . NATO should work to improve dialogue between the
former Soviet republics and the Eastern European countries as
well as between these countries and NATO in order to contrib-
ute to the peaceful solutions of disputes. In this respect,
the Alliance should establish regular diplomatic liaisons and
military contacts with the countries of central and Eastern
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Europe. Civilian and military authorities of these countries
should be invited to NATO meetings to intensify exchange of
views and information on security policy issues. [Ref. 50]
Through such means, NATO can make full use of the unprecedent-
ed opportunities afforded by the growth of freedom and
democracy throughout Europe and can create an environment
which improves mutual understanding of respective security
concerns, reduces suspicion and increases predictability in
security affairs. All of these reinforce stability in Europe.
This useful atmosphere of dialogue which is created by NATO,
provides a foundation for greater cooperation throughout
Europe and enhances the ability to resolve differences and
conflicts by peaceful means. [Ref. 46 :p. 7] The Alliance
should pursue cooperation with all states in Europe. NATO
then must develop broader and more productive patterns of
bilateral and multilateral cooperation in all relevant fields
of European security. In this NATO's aim is to prevent crises
and, when they arise, to manage them effectively. [Ref. 46 :p.
8] .
c. Crisis response: military measures
In addition, NATO should establish a multina-
tional, small, highly mobile peacekeeping or disaster relief
force capable of being deployed rapidly to the area of
instability or conflict. It should be technologically
intensive force, equipped not only with airborne surveillance
capabilities but with remote sensors capable of detecting
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military activities by the fighting parties. [Ref. 49:p.516]
This force should also have disaster relief capabilities which
include transportation, medical, engineer, and demolition
units [Ref. 51: P. 75] . This unit can be used in NATO territo-
ry for disaster relief operations such as in refugee crises or
environmental clean-up operations. This force should be
deployed out -of -area for peacekeeping duties. The out -of area
deployment should take place if an only if an agreement is
reached with the CIS and the Eastern European countries and
upon their invitation for the purpose of facilitating the
management and control of ethnic or nationalist conflict in
Eastern Europe.
In order to deter or defeat aggression today, the
second requirement of crisis response: reconstitute and
transfer the forces promptly to the trouble spot, demands
extraordinarily flexible forces. Capacity to reinforce the
trouble spot militarily depends on four basic elements: (1)
force structure, (2) mobility, (3) host nation support, (4)
mobilization. [Ref. 52:p.l2]
Force Structure- In order to deter and defeat an
enemy, NATO should first have an effective force structure;
the right mix of weapons and people. This force structure
must be carefully designed to meet the enemy's. That is, the
weapons must be superior in quality and the people must be
trained and organized to maximize the effectiveness of the
technology. [Ref. 52: p. 12] With this respect, NATO forces
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must be equipped with modern conventional weapons. The wide
range of missions that the future reduced forces may have to
execute (one example for such missions may be to manage a
refugee crisis) requires NATO to conduct modern training which
uses up-to-date techniques, at all levels. [Ref. 53:p.7-8]
The kinds of forces required by the crisis response strategy
are main defense forces, augmentation forces and reaction
forces. The bulk of NATO's military forces will be allocated
to main defense forces, which at the corps level, will be
composed of military units from two or three countries. Each
of these composite will be assigned as the primary defense
force for a specific country or region. In peacetime, they
will be only partly manned. For example, a corps may have
only its headquarters and one fully constituted division
active in peacetime. The remainder of its divisions and
brigades would be at lower readiness or mobilization status
with a "core" of active soldiers. [Ref. 45: p. 89] The status
of readiness of active units depends on location and perceived
risk. The units on southern and southeastern flanks must be
at higher readiness status than those on the Central Front.
Augmentation forces will consist of European and North
American formations- -at both ready and mobilization status-
-
which will provide the backup to committed main defense forces
and reaction forces, wherever a major threat makes this
necessary. [Ref. 45: p. 89] Reaction forces are multinational
forces allocated to major NATO commanders for an early
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military response to a crisis. Should crisis management fail,
reaction forces would contribute to the general defense
posture. "Immediate- reaction forces" will be at the highest
readiness status and will be rapidly deployable in order to
react to crisis in any region in the area of that major NATO
commander. [Ref. 53 :p. 4] "Rapid- reaction forces" will be
built around a multinational corps that can be deployed either
as an early military response to a crisis or, in an escalating
situation, as an integrated component of other NATO forces in
the deployment region [Ref. 45:p. 89].
Mobility- No matter how good the structure,
equipment and the training of the armed forces are, they
cannot get the desired results if they cannot be in the right
place at the right time and in the right numbers. In a word,
military forces must be mobile if they are to play a signifi-
cant role in a crisis. They must be both strategically and
tactically mobile. They should be transferred from their
peace time locations to the crisis area promptly and then
should have the capability of maneuvering effectively on the
battlefield. To achieve the strategic mobility, first an
effective airlift capability is necessary since, only the
speed of modern transport aircraft can transfer a force into
a region quickly. But these airlift forces will normally
consist of light armor and infantry, with some limited air
power. For most contingencies, these light reinforcements
show only the resolution to use military force. Airlift alone
139
cannot ensure the transfer of main battle forces which are
made up of large numbers of highly mechanized and armored
forces . The movement of the heavy equipment can be accom-
plished by sealift. The ships that will carry these heavy
forces must be prepositioned at the departure ports in order
to make the movement from the peace time locations to the
crisis area quickly. Prepositioning ships offers valuable
logistical flexibility; they cannot, however, provide the on-
site reception and further movement necessary to get a force
out of the port and onto the battlefield. Reception forces
must be either in place initially or be quickly placed into
the host country before the tactical deployment of combat
forces, in order to receive and deploy follow- on forces. [Ref
.
52:pp. 13-14] To achieve the tactical mobility, NATO forces
should have the capability of locating, identifying, outmaneu-
vering and outshooting the enemy forces. In this respect,
units should be equipped with the Joint Surveillance Target
Radar System and Global Positioning System, should have modern
air superiority, multirole aircraft, modern armored vehicles
and communication devises. [Ref. 53: pp. 7-8]
Host nation support- Allied logistics organiza-
tions must be created with the contribution of the host nation
to manage the acquisition and movement of material to the
combat forces, especially as these forces become more multina-
tional. Host nation must facilitate the activities of NATO
logistics organizations to organize host nation logistics
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functions. These organizations must have visibility and
control of host nation's assets during crisis to effectively
allocate people, material, and facilities. [Ref. 52 :p. 15]
Mobilization- If any decision is made to rein-
force a crisis area, it should also be decided whether to
mobilize for war. Key factors in a decision to mobilize will
include the industrial base and call-up of military reserves.
[Ref. 52: p. 15] NATO nations must develop plans to manage
mobilization of main defense and augmentation forces rapidly
and in an orderly manner. Also plans must be made to recon-
stitute the necessary industrial base in order to support the
war efforts.
d. Reduced forward presence: preventing nuclear
proliferation and managing arms reduction
Another element of the new strategy rather than
crisis response is to control the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, form an effective defense against such
weapons and verify the agreed upon force reductions in Europe,
known as Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) . First of
all, member countries which possess such weapons technology
should ensure that this technology is not transferred to
another country, eager to acquire such weapons. Since, it is
impossible to eliminate technology trade, member nations
should come up with mechanisms to be sure that technology
trade does not have adverse impact on security. These
mechanisms could be 'adequate export control systems, on-site
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verifications and inspectors from western countries to verify
the legitimate use of western technologies. Inspections of
industrial facilities should be without restriction and
without prior notice. [Ref. 54 :p. 258] NATO should form a
center as a subordinate unit to the Nuclear Planning Group,
manned by international staff in order to coordinate and
facilitate these activities. Especially, NATO should send
experts to former Soviet Union in order to assist the authori-
ties in the protection and dismantle of its nuclear arsenal
.
As for the conventional disarmament in Europe,
there are two types of measures: non-cooperative and coopera-
tive measures. In the former category are space-based
reconnaissance; airborne stand- of reconnaissance; shipboard
reconnaissance; and land based signals intelligence, seismic
and environmental monitoring. Cooperative measures include
aerial surveys; monitoring of maneuvers, military training and
exercises; monitoring exit and entry points; on site routine
and on- challenge inspections; perimeter control of barracks
and depots; inspection of production and assembly facilities,
both in-plant inspection and perimeter control; and monitoring
of weapons and equipment deactivation or scrapping. Barracks,
airfields, missile positions and depots should be visited at
least once a year. [Ref. 55 :p. 33] NATO should form a center
and through that center should perform both categories of
verification activities mentioned above. NATO has to make
reduction in its own armament in order to fulfill its treaty
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obligations as well. But, doing so NATO also has to protect
its most modern equipment. Member nations with excess
equipment that would have to be destroyed otherwise, should
transfer modern equipment to nations that use older equipment
such as Southern Flank countries. The countries which receive
the modern equipment would then destroy the older equipment.
[Ref. 53 :p. 3] This arms transfers will substantially improve
the weakness of the Southern region which is exposed to a
potential threat now and equipped with older equipment. Also,
NATO should shift its financial priorities from the central
region to the Southern Flank. This requires cooperation with
the developing defense industries of these countries including
technology transfer and improvement in the NATO infrastructure
in the region to facilitate the timely deployment of the
forces to the region and effective supply of them.
e. Reduced forward Presence: defending against
weapons of mass destruction
Even if member countries, which possess the
technology to produce such weapons, take measures to eliminate
the transfer of this technology to the third parties, there
are other countries which sell their expertise. So, it is
impossible to prevent the countries, which are eager to
possess these weapons, from getting them.
As a result NATO should improve its defenses
against such weapons. NATO should develop GPALS (Global
Protection Against Limited Strikes) system. Possible Allied
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needs for such protection and involvement in development
programs should be discussed in North Atlantic Council and
Defense Planning Committee. NATO should develop joint
industrial development programs for research and production of
the systems. GPALS would involve three segments: new land-
based defensive missiles, tactical anti-air missiles such as
an upgraded Patriot or a new longer- range Theater High-
Altitude Air Defense System (THAADS) which could be deployed
in member countries, and a space based "Brilliant Pebbles"
interceptor system. [Ref. 56 :p. 793] The first and the third
elements of the system may require more research and time to
produce and put into service, but until THAADS is developed
NATO should make full use of the existing Patriot missiles and
related command, control, communication and intelligence
systems. These weapons should be positioned on the Southeast-
ern Flank countries immediately to meet potential challenges
to the region.
F. SUMMARY
In light of the environmental factors NATO's mandates,
mission and strategy should be revised. NATO's mandates
should be revised to give the Alliance a broader area of
action because the events outside the member nations' territo-
ries may directly affect NATO. Second reason for this
revision is that, NATO should respond any crisis threatening
its security before it reaches to its borders. NATO's mission
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should include the elements of promoting stability in the
Europe as a main objective since the security of the member
nations are closely related to this. NATO's new strategy
should first prevent the instabilities from developing into
major problems by political means, and if necessary deal with
the crises effectively through flexible and versatile forces.
New strategy should also deal with arms reduction treaty




VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
1= The review of the literature about strategy revealed
that the concept of strategy encompasses the goals, objec-
tives, action plans, resource allocations and policies.
Although the content of these components vary from organiza-
tion to organization, but the basics remain the same.
2. Strategic planning is the whole process of defining
the mandates, the goals and objectives, assessing the environ-
ment (both external and internal) , identifying the central
issues and developing action plans, resource allocations and
policies to manage these issues. In other words, strategic
planning is a systematic process. It is also important that
if the organization wants to make minor variations in the
existing strategic themes, than it doesn't have to initiate
the whole process. Different authors in the area of strategy
offer different approaches to strategic planning, but they all
include the basic steps mentioned above.
3. One of the major elements of the strategic planning
is the environmental analysis. In fact, environmental
analysis is the main source of the strategic issues. Organi-
zations should monitor their external environment in order to
find opportunities and to identify the threats. Internal
environmental analysis enable" the organizations to know their
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major strengths and weaknesses. Then the organizations should
compare the external and internal environments to see whether
the strengths of the organization can exploit the opportuni-
ties or the weaknesses worsen the threats. A sound strategy
should exploit the opportunities while minimizing the threats.
4. It would be a mistake for the organizations to look
at only the current environment. Organizations should make
predictions about the future environment in which they may
operate. They should create alternative futures and use them
first to identify the strategic issues and later to develop
the strategies. A sound strategy should deal with both the
current and the future situations. Organizations can use
quantitative or qualitative forecasting techniques to create
alternative futures.
5. NATO's foundation, and its first 40 years hold most
of the conclusions about strategy and strategic planning
mentioned above. NATO was founded because of a huge and
immediate external threat in 1949 . European Nations had also
opportunities and internal strengths and weaknesses. They
exploited the main opportunities, American eagerness to get
involved in European matters by providing economic and
military aid, Soviet weaknesses and their own eagerness to
unite, by signing the North Atlantic Treaty which linked the
North America to Europe and left Soviet Union alone in Europe.
Their main strength at that time, cohesion and resolution,
extended these opportunities. The North Atlantic Treaty
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clearly defined the mandates, objectives and the goals.
Planners articulated policies, action plans and resource
allocations by developing short-term, medium- term and long-
term defense plans.
6. NATO continued to monitor the environment after
formulating its first strategy and made variations from its
first strategy accordingly. NATO shifted from a conventional
defense to massive retaliation in 1954, and from massive
retaliation to flexible response in 1967. Environmental
factors made it necessary for NATO to make these shifts.
These environmental factors weren't fundamental, so they
didn't necessitate a whole strategic planning process but
variations in the strategy which were not major.
7. NATO's external environment has changed fundamentally
since 1989. NATO may relax by looking at just the current
environment. When we look at the future possibilities, we see
that possible events can affect NATO deeply. All of these
factors make it necessary for NATO to implement the whole
planning process again because the environment necessitates
major variations in the strategic themes.
B. THESIS RESEARCH QUESTIONS REVISITED
The primary research question of this thesis is "As a
result of the changing military and political environment in
Europe and -in other troubled areas, the strategy of NATO must
be re-examined. How is the existing strategy likely to change
148
in light of these shifts in NATO's relevant military,
political and economic environment? " The whole new strategic
planning process outlined in Chapter VI provides one answer to
this question. As a result of the new environmental factors
along with the possible future developments the mandates and
mission of NATO should be revised and new policies, action
plans and resource allocations described in Chapter VI,
Section E should be approved in order to manage the new issues
described in the same chapter.
A subsidiary research question is "What is strategy and
what is a suitable model for strategic planning? " Definitions
presented in Chapter II, Section B offers an answer to the
first part of this question. There are a lot of models in
literature about strategic planning. The model presented in
Chapter II, Section C is suitable, because it contains the
essential elements of strategic planning for public and non-
profit organizations.
The second and third subsidiary research questions are
" How was the military and political environment when NATO was
founded? " and " How did NATO's strategy evolve? " Chapter III,
Section C presents the external environmental factors and
Section D presents the internal environmental factors when
NATO was founded. Chapter III, Section E describes the
possible future events through the minds of the NATO planners
in 1949. The rest of the chapter presents the first strategy
of NATO, a conventional defense and changes in the environment
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and the evolution of NATO's strategy from this conventional
defense to massive retaliation and flexible response.
Another subsidiary research question is "What has
happened in the past three years that is relevant to NATO's
future? " Chapter IV, Section C furnishes the external
environmental changes which have created new opportunities and
threats to NATO. The rest of the chapter furnishes the
internal environmental changes which contributed to the
strengths of NATO and caused weaknesses. Chapter V constructs
scenarios to identify the future developments which are
relevant to NATO's future.
The final subsidiary research question is " In light of
the changes in the environment what should be the new strategy
of NATO? " Chapter VI provides one answer to this question.
The mandates of NATO should be modified to give NATO a broader
area of activity, its mission should be revised to include
non-military means afforded by the new opportunities and the
strategy should be changed to include dialogue and co-opera-
tion with the former foes to prevent crises and to give NATO
flexibility to respond the crises, should they occur. Also
the new strategy should provide means for preventing the
nuclear proliferation and for verifying the arms reduction.
C. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
1. NATO committees should hold regular meetings with the
representatives of the former Soviet Republics and Eastern
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European countries to discuss security issues. NATO, should
also form the multinational peace keeping force immediately
and prepare it for possible uses. This force can be used
right now in Yugoslavia or in Nagorno Karabag.
2. Negotiations for France's return to the integrated
military structure of NATO should be started. France's
absence in this structure creates a gap in the defense of
Southern Region.
3. As part of the European Rapid Reaction Forces, a
standing naval force in Mediterranean should be formed. This
force protects the sea lines and flow of land troops on
Mediterranean should a crisis occur in the Middle East or in
North Africa.
4. Since multinationality is a part of the new strategy
then interoperability is very important. Formations composed
of units from different nations should communicate with each
other effectively and use the same doctrine. For this reason
NATO should initiate a standardization program, both techno-
logical and doctrinal, to solve interoperability problems.
5. Exercises should be conducted to improve multination-
al operations and to rehearse the transfer of troops drawn
from different regions of the Alliance to a trouble spot.
6. Exercises such as Allied Express, Display Determina-
tion, Dragon Hammer, which were conducted on Turkish Thrace to
rehearse a defense against Warsaw Pact forces should be
conducted on Southern Turkey to make the troops familiar with
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the terrain. The scenario should be based on a crisis in the
Middle East.
7. Patriot missiles should be provided for the Turkish
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